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Criminal gang activity plagues America's inner cities1 and sub-
urbs.2 Every day, newspapers are filled with stories of drive-by shoot-
ings,3 narcotics trafficking,4 and the growing influence of criminal
gangs.5 Law enforcement agencies are virtually powerless to stop
criminal gangs before some crime is committed because most present
statutes and ordinances only allow police officers to act after a crime
has occurred.6 As a result, whole communities are terrorized by gun-
toting gang members. 7
Loitering statutes are typical preventive statutes that give the po-
lice an opportunity to arrest suspected criminals during the prelimi-
nary stages of other, more serious criminal activity.8 Their preventive
* I would like to thank Professor Richard McAdams for suggesting such an interesting
topic and for taking the time to provide some useful insights on how to approach this Note. I
would also like to thank Professor Margaret Stewart, my faculty advisor on this Note. Professor
Stewart's suggestions were invaluable in guiding me along the right path. Many thanks also to
several other faculty members at Chicago-Kent who provided much valuable assistance, espe-
cially Professor James Lindgren for encouraging me to write conversationally and Professor
David Rudstein for offering useful comments on drafting the model statute. Finally, many
thanks to my student editors, Al Michalik and Ana Flynn. They deserve most of the credit for
making this Note readable. As usual, I, and only I, receive full credit only for the mistakes
contained herein.
1. E.g., Don Terry, Chicago Housing Project Basks in a Tense Peace, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2,
1992, at A10 (describing the aftermath of the gang-related shooting of a child at a Chicago
housing project).
2. E.g., Geordie Wilson, It's Not the Same Old Federal Way-Formerly Sleepy Suburb Has
Gained New Faces, Political Clout, SEAIrLE TIMES, Nov. 2, 1992, at BI (describing, in part, the
introduction of criminal gangs in suburban communities).
3. E.g., William Recktenwald & Jennifer Lenhart, The Killing Way Weighs Heavily, CHI.
TRIB., Sept. 29, 1992, at Cl (describing the violence that accompanies criminal gangs).
4. E.g., id.
5. E.g., Jesse Katz, Concern Grows Over Girls' More Deadly Role in Gangs, L.A. TIMES,
Oct. 16, 1992, at Al (describing the expanding influence of criminal gangs).
6. See infra text accompanying notes 50-52.
7. E.g., Seven Receive Life Terms in Racketeering Case, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 1992, at 26
(describing the terror tactics used by criminal gang members).
8. E.g., People v. Superior Court (Caswell), 758 P.2d 1046 (Cal. 1988) (any unlawful con-
duct); Watts v. State, 463 So. 2d 205 (Fla. 1985) (harm to persons or property); City of Cleveland
v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325 (Cleveland (Ohio) Mun. Ct. 1987) (prostitution); Jordan Bers,
Comment, Is There Something Suspicious About the Constitutionality of Loitering Laws?, 50
OHIO ST. L.J. 717, 717 (1989).
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
nature makes loitering statutes a promising means of stemming crimi-
nal gang activity. Thus, criminal gang members are thwarted from ter-
rorizing their respective communities and committing violent crimes
at will.
However, loitering statutes are fraught with constitutional
problems.9 Thus, they must be carefully drafted to avoid a vast array
of constitutional challenges. 10 Nevertheless, the statutes cannot be so
watered down as to undermine their preventive purpose.
This Note has several purposes. First, it briefly examines the his-
tory of loitering laws." Second, typical constitutional challenges to
loitering laws are examined and explained.' 2 Finally, Chicago's anti-
gang loitering ordinance is scrutinized for constitutional deficiencies,'
3
and an alternative, constitutional means of dealing with criminal gang
activity will be suggested. 14
I. HISTORY OF ANGLO-AMERICAN LOITERING LAWS
Loitering laws come from early English vagrancy laws.15 In 1349,
the first Statute of Labourers restricted the movement of unemployed,
non-landowning people. 16 The Statute was enacted primarily for eco-
9. See, e.g., Berns, supra note 8; Anthony G. Amsterdam, Federal Constitutional Restric-
tions on the Punishment of Crimes of Status, Crimes of General Obnoxiousness, Crimes of Dis-
pleasing Police Officers, and the Like, 3 CRIM. L. BULL. 205 (1967); Robin Yeamans, Note,
Constitutional Attacks on Vagrancy Laws, 20 STAN. L. REv. 782 (1968).
10. See infra part II.
11. See infra part I.
12. See infra part II.
13. See infra part III.A.
14. See infra part III.B.
15. United States ex rel. Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1171 (2d Cir. 1974), affd sub
nom. Lefkowitz v. Newsome, 420 U.S. 283 (1975); Berns, supra note 8, at 717; Yeamans, supra
note 9, at 782.
Loitering prohibitions were usually contained within English vagrancy laws because both
concepts so substantially overlap. Mark Malone, Note, Homelessness in a Modem Urban Setting,
10 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 749, 758 (1982). That the concepts overlap is rather obvious. Loitering
is defined as "stand[ing] idly around; . . . linger[ing] or spend[ing] time idly." BLACK's LAW
DICIONARY 942 (6th ed. 1990). Vagrancy is defined as "going... from place to place by a
person without visible means of support, who is idle, and who, though able to work for his or her
maintenance, refuses to do so, but lives without labor or on the charity of others." Id. at 1549.
16. Yeamans, supra note 9, at 782. The Statute of Labourers was only "the first 'fully
fledged vagrancy statute."' William Trosch, Comment, The Third Generation of Loitering Laws
Goes to Court: Do Laws That Criminalize "Loitering With the Intent to Sell Drugs" Pass Consti-
tutional Muster?, 71 N.C. L. REv. 513, 515-16 (1993) (quoting Peter Archard, Vagrancy-a Liter-
ature Review, in VAGRANCY, SOME NEW PERSPECrIVES 11, 17 (Tim Cook ed., 1979)). English
vagrancy laws actually date to around 700 A.D. and the reign of the obscure King Ine. Id. at 515.
The purpose of those early vagrancy laws was the same as their successors-to prevent laborers
from leaving their feudal lords. Id. The penalty was pretty stiff for violating King Ine's vagrancy
law: anyone caught running away from their feudal lord was returned to the lord and forced to
pay the lord sixty shillings (which, at the time, was the equivalent of sixty cows). ld. at 515 n.26.
[Vol. 69:461
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nomic reasons: to provide cheap labor for landowners in the after-
math of the Black Plague, thus preventing the collapse of the feudal
system.17 These goals were accomplished by forcing people to remain
employed in fixed areas, working for fixed wages. 18
When the feudal system collapsed, vagrancy statutes survived as a
means of preventing crime. 19 The evolved vagrancy laws assumed that
the unemployed members of society supported themselves through
crime. 20 To prevent unemployed wanderers from preying on the
wealthy, the laws restricted the movements and activities of wanderers
who frequented unpopulated roads.21 The punishment for violating
these laws could be harsh. For example, during the reign of Elizabeth
I, facilities were built where able-bodied vagrants were sentenced to
hard labor until they found employment or until they were banished
from the kingdom.22
The evolution of England's vagrancy laws eventually led to a dif-
ferentiation between criminal vagrancy and poor-relief vagrancy. 23
Criminal vagrancy laws were originally aimed at those wanderers and
beggars physically capable of working.24 However, in 1744 vagrancy
crimes were divided into three classes: "idle and disorderly persons,
rogues and vagabonds, and incorrigible rogues. '25 As a result, mere
status-such as being poor or unemployed-was no longer illegal;
rather, only criminal conduct was punishable. 26 The 1744 laws are the
foundation of current English vagrancy and loitering statutes.27
Vagrancy and loitering laws were quickly enacted upon the set-
tling of the American colonies, and remained in force after the colo-
nies were freed from English rule.28 American vagrancy statutes were
17. Yeamans, supra note 9, at 782.
18. Id.
19. Newsome, 492 F.2d at 1172; Berns, supra note 8, at 718.
20. Newsome, 492 F.2d at 1172; Berns, supra note 8, at 718; Malone, supra note 15, at 754.
The change in English vagrancy laws from an economic rationale to a crime prevention
rationale first came about in the "Slavery Acts." Malone, supra note 15, at 754 n.17. The Slav-
ery Acts were so named because they enslaved for two years anyone convicted of living "idly
and loiteringly .. " Id.
21. Newsome, 492 F.2d at 1172; Berns, supra note 8, at 718; Malone, supra note 15, at 754
n.16. This was effectuated primarily through the requirement that the sovereign give written
permission before any laborers could travel from their homes. Malone, supra note 15, at 754
n.16.
22. Malone, supra note 15, at 754 n.17.
23. Id.
24. Id. at 754 nn.16-17.
25. Id. at 754 n.17.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Yeamans, supra note 9, at 782.
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based on their English counterparts and founded on crime prevention
theories.29 These statutes eventually encompassed a wide range of
criminal and otherwise undesirable activity, including begging, loiter-
ing, public drunkenness, gambling, prostitution, and narcotics
trafficking.
30
The constitutionality of vagrancy and loitering laws remained vir-
tually unchallenged for most of this country's history for two rea-
sons.31 First, poor defendants could rarely afford legal counsel to
prosecute an appeal. 32 And second, the lengthy appeals process was
usually barely begun before defendants had finished serving their typi-
cally short sentences. 33 These problems disappeared when the United
States Supreme Court handed down its decision in Gideon v. Wain-
wright,34 guaranteeing legal representation for indigent defendants ac-
cused of felonies.
Shortly after Gideon, the courts began hearing appeals on va-
grancy and loitering convictions. 35 State courts soon struck down sev-
eral vagrancy and loitering laws for various constitutional
deficiencies. 36 Eventually a constitutional attack on a vagrancy statute
reached the United States Supreme Court.
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville,37 the Court agreed to de-
termine the constitutionality of a Jacksonville, Florida, vagrancy ordi-
nance.38 Papachristou was a consolidation of five cases where the
29. Berns, supra note 8, at 718; Malone, supra note 15, at 754-56. The original American
colonial vagrancy laws actually had two components: crime prevention and poverty relief. Ma-
lone, supra note 15, at 755 n.18. However, the poverty relief components were more akin to a
crude form of welfare than to a form of criminal punishment. Id.




34. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). Gideon incorporated the Sixth Amendment's right to counsel into
the Fourteenth Amendment, thus applying it against the states. This guaranteed legal counsel to
any defendants accused of a felony if the defendants couldn't themselves afford legal counsel.
35. Yeamans, supra note 9, at 783.
36. Id. at 784 n.27.
37. 405 U.S. 156 (1972).
38. The questioned Jacksonville ordinance read as follows:
Rogues and Vagabonds, or dissolute persons who go about begging, common gamblers,
persons who use juggling or unlawful games or plays, common drunkards, common
night walkers, thieves, pilferers or pickpockets, traders in stolen property, lewd, wan-
ton, and lascivious persons, keepers of gambling places, common railers and brawlers,
persons wandering or strolling around from place to place without any lawful purpose
or object, habitual loafers, disorderly persons, persons neglecting all lawful business
and habitually spending their time by frequenting houses of ill fame, gambling houses,
or places where alcoholic beverages are sold or served, persons able to work but habit-
ually living upon the earnings of their wives or minor children shall be deemed vagrants




various defendants were convicted under the city's vagrancy ordi-
nance of such offenses as prowling by auto, loitering, disorderly loiter-
ing, being a common thief, and being a vagabond. 39 The Court
unanimously struck down the ordinance as unconstitutionally vague
because such a broad prohibition of seemingly innocuous activities
didn't provide citizens adequate notice of what conduct was forbidden
and didn't sufficiently harness police discretion.4°
However, Papachristou didn't strike down loitering and vagrancy
statutes per se. Rather, the decision only placed clarity requirements
on the drafting of those statutes.41 Of course, state legislatures-be-
ing comprised, in substantial part, of lawyers-were quick to note the
limited scope of Papachristou, and new loitering ordinances that met
the Court's guidelines were quickly enacted. Many of those new stat-
utes have, in turn, been upheld by state appellate courts against con-
stitutional attacks.42 Thus, properly drafted loitering statutes are still
constitutionally enforced to help prevent various crimes, including
narcotics trafficking 43 and prostitution.44
The Chicago City Council expanded the scope of loitering ordi-
nances by enacting an antigang loitering ordinance to give the police a
flexible tool for stemming criminal gang activity.45 That statute reads
as follows:
(a) Whenever a police officer observes a person whom he reason-
ably believes to be a criminal gang member loitering in any public
place with one or more other persons, he shall order all such per-
sons to disperse and remove themselves from the area. Any person
who does not promptly obey such an order is in violation of this
section.
(b) It shall be an affirmative defense to an alleged violation of this
section that no person who was observed loitering was in fact a
member of a criminal street gang.
(c) As used in this section:
(1) "Loiter" means to remain in any one place with no appar-
ent purpose.
Id. at 156-57 n.1 (quoting JACKSONVILLE, FLA., ORDINANCE CODE § 26-57 (1965)).
39. Id. at 158.
40. Id. at 170-71. For a detailed explanation of the void-for-vagueness doctrine, see infra
parts II.A.1-3.
41. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 171.
42. E.g., City of South Bend v. Bowman, 434 N.E.2d 104 (Ind. Ct. App. 1982); People v.
Bright, 520 N.E.2d 1355 (N.Y. 1988); State v. Evans, 326 S.E.2d 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); City of
Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1980).
43. See, e.g., City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992).
44. See, e.g., City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325 (Cleveland (Ohio) Mun. Ct.
1987).
45. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992); see also Martha Middleton, Gang Law
Will Meet Court Test, NAT'L L.J., July 2, 1992, at 3.
1993]
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(2) "Criminal street gang" means any ongoing organization,
association in fact or group of three or more persons, whether for-
mal or informal, having as one of its substantial activities the com-
mission of one or more of the criminal acts enumerated in
paragraph (3), and whose members, individually or collectively, en-
gage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.
(3) "Criminal gang activity" means the commission, attempted
commission, or solicitation of the following offenses, provided that
the offenses are committed by two or more persons, or by an indi-
vidual at the direction of, or in association with, any criminal street
gang, with the specific intent to promote, further or assist in any
criminal conduct by gang members:
The following sections of the Criminal Code of 1961: 9-1 (mur-
der), 9-3.3 (drug-induced homicide), 10-1 (kidnapping), 10-4 (forci-
ble detention), subsection (a)(13) of Section 12-2 (aggravated
assault-discharging firearm), 12-4 (aggravated battery), 12-4.1 (hei-
nous battery), 12-4.2 (aggravated battery with a firearm), 12-4.3 (ag-
gravated battery of a child), 12-4.6 (aggravated battery of a senior
citizen), 12-6 (intimidation), 12-6.1 (compelling organization mem-
bership of persons), 12-11 (home invasion), 12-14 (aggravated crimi-
nal sexual assault), 18-1 (robbery), 18-2 (armed robbery), 19-1
(burglary), 19-3 (residential burglary), 19-5 (criminal fortification of
a residence or building), 20-1 (arson), 20-1.1 (aggravated arson), 20-
2 (possession of explosives or explosive incendiary devices), subsec-
tion (a)(6), (a)(7), (a)(9) or (a)(12) of Section 24-1 (unlawful use of
weapons), 24-1.1 (unlawful use or possession of weapons by felons
or persons in the custody of Department of Corrections facilities),
24-1.2 (aggravated discharge of a firearm), subsection (d) of Section
25-1 (mob action-violence), 33-1 (bribery), 33A-2 (armed violence);
Sections 5, 5.1, 7 or 9 of the Cannabis Control Act where the of-
fense is a felony (manufacture or delivery of cannabis, cannabis traf-
ficking, calculated criminal cannabis conspiracy and related
offenses); or Sections 401, 401.1, 405, 406.1, 407 or 407.1 of the Illi-
nois Controlled Substances Act (illegal manufacture or delivery of a
controlled substance, controlled substance trafficking, calculated
criminal drug conspiracy and related offenses).
(4) "Pattern of criminal gang activity" means two or more acts
of criminal gang activity of which at least two such acts were com-
mitted within five years of each other and at least one such act oc-
curred after the effective date of this Section.
(5) "Public place" means the public way and any other location
open to the public, whether publicly or privately owned.
(d) Any person who violated this Section is subject to a fine of not
less than $100 and not more than $500 for each offense, or imprison-
ment for not more than six months, or both.
In addition to or instead of the above penalties, any person
who violates this Section may be required to perform up to 120
[Vol. 69:461
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hours of community service pursuant to Section 1-4-120 of this
Code.
46
It's clearly desirable to give police officers broad powers to prevent
criminal gang activities, and loitering statutes such as the Chicago or-
dinance are suitable vehicles for granting such powers. However, as
will be seen, this ordinance probably cannot survive a constitutional
attack. 47
II. TYPICAL CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES TO LOITERING
STATUTES
"[L]oitering statutes and ordinances are probably the most con-
troversial laws used to prevent crime."'48 Of course, loitering laws
aren't the only preventive statutes enacted by legislatures. Laws
against the inchoate offenses of attempt, solicitation, and conspiracy
are all valid preventive statutes.4 9 However, the inchoate offenses are
only legitimately enforced after some criminal act beyond mere prepa-
ration has occurred,50 whereas loitering laws rarely require any crimi-
nal acts beyond mere preparation before they are legitimately
enforced.51 Loitering laws thus afford the police, judges, and juries
substantial discretion in deciding when a crime has been committed.
5 2
Such discretion is quickly abused.
5 3
To stem discretionary abuses, state and federal courts subject loi-
tering laws to various constitutional tests. This Note will examine four
constitutional attacks typically leveled against loitering ordinances:
vagueness, overbreadth, impermissibly premising arrests on suspicion
rather than on probable cause, and impermissibly criminalizing status.
46. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
47. See infra part III.A.
48. Berns, supra note 8, at 717.
49. Id.
50. See, e.g., United States v. Mandujano, 499 F.2d 370 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S.
1114 (1975) (adopting the Model Penal Code's substantial step test to allow conviction for at-
tempt only if the defendant's overt actions constitute a substantial step towards commission of
the offense); Commonwealth v. Skipper, 294 A.2d 780 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1972) (allowing conviction
for attempt only if the defendant's preparations have progressed beyond the point where the
defendant is likely to voluntarily stop short of committing the full crime); cf. Commonwealth v.
Peaslee, 59 N.E. 55 (Mass. 1901) (suggesting that some conduct constituting mere preparation
may be sufficient for an attempt conviction depending on the proximity of the preparations to
the completion of the crime); see also MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(2) (1962) (defining circum-
stances constituting a substantial step).
51. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015 (1992). The Chicago ordinance doesn't
require any act for a violation to occur. Rather, doing nothing is sufficient to trigger an arrest
and sustain a conviction. Id. § 8-4-015(c)(1). For a more complete explanation of this, see infra
text accompanying notes 193-98.
52. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 167-68 (1972).
53. Id. at 170; see also Berns, supra note 8, at 717.
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A. Vagueness
1. The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine
The Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause requires that
state laws and regulations be both sufficiently clear to provide people
notice of what the state commands or forbids and provide minimal
guidelines to harness the discretion of those who enforce the laws.54
Laws that fail either requirement are unconstitutional under the void-
for-vagueness (or simply vagueness) doctrine.
The notice requirement is fulfilled if the statute gives persons of
ordinary intelligence warning of what the state commands or for-
bids.55 This foundational principle of due process is premised on the
common sensical notion that people shouldn't be punished for con-
duct they were not told was prohibited.5 6 However, statutes don't
have to meet "impossible standards of clarity" to meet the notice re-
quirement.5 7 Rather, notice is adequate if the statute warns that cer-
tain areas of conduct may be adjudicated illegal.5 8
54. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, 108 (1972); Berns, supra note 8, at 718; Alan D. Hallock, Note, Stop-and-Identify Statutes
After Kolender v. Lawson: Exploring the Fourth and Fifth Amendment Issues, 69 IOWA L. REV.
1057, 1058-59 (1984).
55. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; United States v. Harriss, 347
U.S. 612, 617 (1954); Hallock, supra note 54, at 1059.
56. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108; Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 162; Lanzetta v. New Jersey, 306
U.S. 451, 453 (1939) ("All [persons] are entitled to be informed as to what the State commands
or forbids."); Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 465 (1927) ("[I]t will not do to hold an
average man to the peril of an indictment ... [where] neither the person to decide in advance
nor the jury to try him after the fact can safely and certainly judge the result" of his actions.);
Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926) ("[A] statute... so vague that men of
common intelligence must guess at its meaning. .. violates the first essential of due process.");
Anthony G. Amsterdam, Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court, 109 U.
PA. L. REV. 67, 68-69 (1960).
57. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 361; see also Hallock, supra note 54, at 1059; Amsterdam, supra
note 56, at 68-69.
The Supreme Court has explained the reason for at least some elasticity in certain statutes:
There are areas of human conduct where, by the nature of the problems presented,
legislatures simply cannot establish standards with great precision. [For example,
c]ontrol of the broad range of disorderly conduct that may inhibit a policeman in the
performance of his official duties may be one such area requiring as it does an on-the-
spot assessment of the need to keep order.
Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 581 (1974). But see City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (strik-
ing down as overbroad an ordinance that criminalized interfering with police officers in the
course of their duties), appeal dismissed and cert. denied, 483 U.S. 1001 (1987).
This leads to a related dilemma that legislatures face every time they draft statutes. Namely,
"draft[ing statutes] with narrow particularity... risk[s] nullification by easy evasion of the legis-
lative purpose;... draft[ing] with great generality ... risk[s] ensnarement of the innocent in a
net designed for others." LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-31, at
1033 (2d ed. 1988).
58. See Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498
(1982); Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108.
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Under vagueness analysis, the minimal guidelines requirement
enjoys greater prominence than does the notice requirement.59 There
are two primary reasons for the greater emphasis on this prong of the
test. First, a lack of minimal guidelines allows those who enforce the
laws to encroach upon the legislature's powers to decide basic policy
matters.6° Second, the absence of minimal guidelines enables the po-
lice, judges, and juries to arbitrarily and discriminatorily oppress
members of minority groups.61 Thus, statutes must clearly define the
offense to provide the police and the courts with a clear standard for
determining when violations have occurred. 62
Justice Holmes somewhat matter-of-factly articulated the consequences of allowing some
imprecision in statutory construction. He noted that "the law is full of instances where a man's
fate depends on his estimating rightly... [to] some matter of degree. If his judgement is wrong,
not only may he incur a fine or a short imprisonment.., he may incur the penalty of death."
Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913).
59. Kolender, 461 U.S. at 358.
60. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 108-09; see also John C. Jeffries, Jr., Legality, Vagueness, and the
Construction of Penal Statutes, 71 VA. L. REv. 189, 190 (1985) (noting that courts are politically
incompetent to define crime).
61. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 170 (1972); see also Shuttlesworth v.
City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965); Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 244
(Va. Ct. App. 1988); JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND Dismus-r 177 (1980).
There is another reason why harnessing police and judicial discretion enjoys greater promi-
nence than notice: notice isn't realistically provided by criminal statutes. To the contrary, notice
of criminal statutes is accomplished through publication, even though publication to provide
notice is only permitted as a last resort in civil cases. Jeffries, supra note 60, at 207. Moreover,
criminal statutes are not published in some widely distributed newspaper, which would at least
give people a fighting chance of running across the most recent whims of the legislature. No,
laws are published in books that are only found in large metropolitan libraries, legal libraries, or
law offices. As if this weren't enough, laws are also written by legislators who ignored their
English teachers' advice to keep their writing simple so that it may be more easily compre-
hended. Instead, many laws are incomprehensible to many lawyers; laypersons may just as well
try and translate the Dead Sea Scrolls rather than waste their time trying to figure out what the
law either commands or forbids. See id. at 207-08. Long ago, Judge Learned Hand said that
"[t]here is something monstrous in commands couched in invented and unfamiliar language; an
alien master is worst of all. The language of the law must not be foreign to those who are to
obey it." Learned Hand, Speech in Washington, D.C. (May 11, 1929), in THE NEW YORK PUB-
LIC LIBRARY BOOK OF 20TH-CENTURY AMERICAN QUOTATIONs 293, 293-94 (Stephen Conadio
et al. eds., 1992). Let's not fool ourselves: Dan Rostenkowski is probably the only nonlawyer
who really knows what the tax laws say, and that's only because he wrote most of them.
There is another problem with notice that undermines its importance in the vagueness anal-
ysis. Namely, how can notice be provided where the penal statute may be reinterpreted by the
courts after a person has been arrested? See Jeffries, supra note 60, at 207. It's ludicrous to
suppose that people can really know their state's and the federal government's statutory laws
that occupy shelf after shelf in a law school's library; it's flat out fantasy to presume that people
should also be able to guess how the courts will subsequently interpret a statute. Thus, even
people who have bothered to memorize all of the criminal laws still have no idea what conduct is
forbidden because the courts can change how those laws are interpreted and then punish people
for not conforming with the new interpretation. Id. at 207-08.
62. The justification for this requirement was noted by the Supreme Court more than a
century ago:
It would certainly be dangerous if the legislature could set a net large enough to catch
all possible offenders, and leave it to the courts to step inside and say who could be
19931
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Because different statutes are subjected to different specificity re-
quirements, the courts look at several factors when examining statutes
for sufficient minimal guidelines. First, the statute's nature prescribes
different levels of judicial scrutiny.63 For example, civil statutes and
economic regulations are held to a lesser standard of specificity than
are criminal statutes.64 The justification for this distinction is evident:
the loss of liberty typically associated with violating criminal statutes
is both qualitatively and quantitatively more severe than the monetary
losses associated with other types of statutes.65 Second, a statute's
scope may demand greater specificity. 66 For example, statutes that,
due to their vagueness, infringe on constitutionally protected free-
doms are more closely scrutinized than statutes that broadly define
classes of conduct that can be constitutionally regulated.
67
2. Loitering Laws and the Notice Requirement
The vagueness doctrine requires loitering statutes to give people
adequate notice of what the state forbids.68 The ordinance in
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville did not provide adequate notice
because it broadly proscribed innocuous activities-such as nightwalk-
rightfully detained, and who should be set at large. This would, to some extent, substi-
tute the judicial for the legislative department of the government.
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 221 (1875).
This leads to yet another justification for vagueness doctrine that is often overlooked, or at
least not baldly stated, namely, that vagueness doctrine preserves the separation of powers. Sep-
aration of powers recognizes that the province of the legislature is to make the laws; the province
of the executive branch, roughly, is to enforce those laws; and the province of the judiciary is to
interpret the laws and settle legal disputes. Vague laws place the lawmaking authority in the
hands of the judiciary, thus allowing the courts to perform a function that is only properly per-
formed by the people's elected officials-the legislature. However, this argument doesn't really
hold water because the courts don't actually create entire laws when they interpret vague stat-
utes. Rather, they are merely being given too much latitude in interpreting what the legislature
desired. See Jeffries, supra note 60, at 202-03.
Of course, separation of powers still plays a role in how courts operate. First, the courts
cannot read and apply legislation in a manner completely at odds with the plain meaning of the
statute's words, or in a manner that is clearly contrary to the legislature's intent. Id. at 205.
Second, "in confronting statutory ambiguity, courts should ordinarily avoid large-scale innova-
tion." Id. However, separation of powers isn't much of an issue "in ordinary cases of small-scale
ambiguity .... " Id. Nor is separation of powers really an issue in cases of vague statutes where
the legislature, through vague language, has decided to confer greater interpretive latitude upon
the courts. Id.
63. Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498-99
(1982).
64. Id. at 498.
65. Id. at 498-99.
66. See, e.g., Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147, 150-51 (1959) (setting a stricter standard for
statutes that, due to their vagueness, have a potentially chilling effect on First Amendment liber-
ties to ensure protection of the free dissemination of ideas).
67. See Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 75-76.
68. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162 (1972).
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ing and loafing-that people wouldn't even suspect were illegal.69
Thus, the ordinance was unconstitutionally vague.70
In other cases, loitering laws have been upheld against vagueness
attacks. In State v. Evans,71 a North Carolina appellate court upheld
the state's antiprostitution loitering statute in the face of a vagueness
attack. 72 The North Carolina statute criminalized loitering with the
intent to engage in prostitution.73 Under the statute, a violation con-
sisted of, first, engaging in at least one of three types of specific con-
duct indicative of soliciting prostitution and, second, having the intent
to solicit prostitution.74 The three types of illicit conduct and the in-
tent requirement were all clearly enumerated within the statute.75
Thus, the court said that the statute afforded sufficient notice because
"[p]ersons of ordinary intelligence would readily understand what ille-
gal conduct was prohibited .... -76
3. Loitering Laws and the Minimal Guidelines Requirement
In Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Court held the Jack-
sonville vagrancy ordinance unconstitutionally vague, in part, because
it failed to establish minimal guidelines to harness law enforcement
discretion.77 The all-inclusive nature of the Jacksonville ordinance
69. Id. at 163.
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania clearly summa-
rized the most basic problem with outlawing common, innocuous activities. That court noted
that "[i]f 'loafing' were a criminal activity ... one could expect that all the good citizens in that
community would at some time or other become defendants in a criminal action." Waters v.
McGuriman, 656 F. Supp. 923, 927 (E.D. Pa. 1987). Additionally, "Luis Munoz-Martin, former
Governor of Puerto Rico, commented once that 'loafing' was a national virtue in his common-
wealth and that it should be encouraged." Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 163.
70. Papachristou, 450 U.S. at 171.
71. 326 S.E.2d 303 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985).
72. Id. at 306.
73. Id. at 306 n.1. The statute in question read as follows:
(a) For the purposes of this section, "public place" means any street, sidewalk, bridge,
alley or alleyway, plaza, park, driveway, parking lot or transportation facility, or the
doorways and entrance ways to any building which fronts any of those places, or a
motor vehicle in or on any of those places.
(b) If a person remains or wanders about in a public place and (1) repeatedly beckons
to, stops, or attempts to stop passers-by, or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in
conversation; or (2) repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicles; or (3) repeat-
edly interferes with the free passage of other persons for the purpose of [engaging in
prostitution or committing a crime against nature as defined by other statutes], that
person is guilty of a misdemeanor and, upon conviction, shall be punished as for a





77. 405 U.S. at 170-71.
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permitted and encouraged the police and the courts to arbitrarily and
discriminatorily apply the law against traditionally disfavored
groups.78 A vagrancy or loitering ordinance that, by its broad terms,
casts a net as large as the Jacksonville ordinance "results in a regime
in which the poor and the unpopular are permitted to 'stand on a pub-
lic sidewalk.., only at the whim of any police officer." 79 Such results
so unequally tip the scales of justice that equal protection of the laws
is impossible.
80
There are several ways that loitering statutes can provide suffi-
cient minimal guidelines to the police and the courts. The most obvi-
ous way is to include an intent requirement in the statute8l and to
delineate what circumstances or conduct the police and the courts
may consider when arresting and convicting people for loitering.82 In
City of Milwaukee v. Wilson,8 3 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that
the city's antiprostitution loitering ordinance provided sufficient mini-
mal guidelines. 84 The ordinance had both an intent requirement and a
list of specified conduct that manifested the proscribed purpose of
soliciting prostitution.8 5 The court said that the overt act requirement





Overbreadth is a label attached to two distinct concepts.87 First,
the doctrine has a substantive dimension that prohibits public officials
from enforcing laws that infringe on constitutionally protected free-
78. Id. at 170.
79. Id. (quoting Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90 (1965)).
80. Id. at 171.
81. The Court's opinion in Papachristou alluded to the fact that an intent requirement
would have helped the Jacksonville ordinance by restricting police discretion to only those in-
stances where intent could have been proven. Id. at 163.
82. Lists of specific conduct give people notice of what kinds of conduct may subject them
to arrest. More importantly, however, delineating specific conduct harnesses police discretion to
enforcing the statute in question only when the specific actions set out by the legislature have
been observed. Ford v. United States, 498 A.2d 1135, 1139 (D.C. 1985).
83. 291 N.W.2d 452 (Wis. 1980).
84. ld at 457.
85. Id. at 455.
86. Id. at 457.




doms.88 Second, the overbreadth doctrine has a procedural dimension
characterized by a special standing rule that allows litigants to raise
the rights of third parties to challenge a statute's substantive
infirmities.89
The substantive dimension of the overbreadth doctrine relates to
a law's scope.90 States can't legitimately restrict certain constitution-
ally protected freedoms, particularly First Amendment liberties.91
The overbreadth doctrine invalidates statutes that, by their broad
scope, regulate activities the iegislature is constitutionally prohibited
from regulating.
92
The courts apply a two-step analysis when subjecting statutes to
the substantive dimension of the overbreadth doctrine. 93 First, the
law is read in light of any limiting constructions the state's courts have
placed on the statute.94 Second, the courts determine the degree to
which the statute as applied will infringe on protected activities.95 A
88. Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 114 (1972); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S.
88, 97 (1940); see also TIBE, supra note 57, § 12-27; Monoghan, supra note 87, at 3. See gener-
ally Note, The First Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 HARV. L. REV. 844 (1970).
89. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 612 (1973); United States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17,
21-22 (1960).
Several scholars argue that overbreadth isn't really comprised of two separate doctrines.
Professor Monoghan contends that the overbreadth doctrine doesn't contain a separate standing
rule. Rather, the standing rule is merely consistent with the "application of conventional stand-
ing concepts in the First Amendment context." Monoghan, supra note 87, at 3. "Under 'conven-
tional' standing principles, a litigant has always had the right to be judged in accordance with a
constitutionally valid rule of law." Id. Professor Tribe apparently agrees with Professor
Monoghan's contention. TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-27.
The Court's decisions don't appear to support such a hypothesis. Granted, statutes alleg-
edly infringing on First Amendment liberties are more closely scrutinized than other statutes,
particularly under vagueness analysis. E.g., United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 550 (1975)
("[V]agueness challenges to statutes which do not involve First Amendment freedoms must be
examined in the light of the facts of the case at hand."). However, "[o]ne to whose conduct a
statute clearly applies may not successfully challenge it for vagueness." Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S.
733, 756 (1974) (emphasis added). Moreover, most courts, when referring to the standing com-
ponent, clearly label it an exception to traditional standing requirements. See, e.g., Broadrick,
413 U.S. at 611; Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
90. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114-15; TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-27; Monoghan, supra note 87, at
3.
91. TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-27; Amsterdam, supra note 56, at 75-76.
92. Grayned, 408 U.S. at 114; Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 489 (1960); City of Cleveland
v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1328 (Cleveland (Ohio) Mun. Ct. 1987); Thornhill, 310 U.S. at 97.
93. Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974, 977-78 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
94. Id. at 977. There are restrictions on limiting constructions. First, state statutes can only
be limited in scope by the respective state's courts. Gooding v. Wilson, 405 U.S. 518, 520 (1972).
Second, "[b]y pruning a statute of its overbroad sections, courts run the risk of leaving the re-
mainder impermissibly vague." TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-29, at 1030. Third, some statutes are
either so poorly drafted or so overbroad that courts cannot possibly limit them without render-
ing the statute unconstitutionally vague. E.g., Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d at 243.
95. Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601, 615 (1973); City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451,
458 (1987); Johnson, 569 F. Supp. at 977; see also TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-28.
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statute is struck down for being overbroad if it substantially infringes
on constitutionally protected activities, regardless of whether the stat-
ute may be legitimately applied in certain instances.
In City of Houston v. Hill,96 the United States Supreme Court
struck down as overbroad an ordinance that made it unlawful to inter-
rupt a police officer in the course of the officer's duties. 97 That ordi-
nance was substantially overbroad because it "criminalize[d] a
substantial amount of constitutionally protected speech, and [it] ac-
cord[ed] the police unconstitutional discretion in enforcement." 98
The procedural dimension of the overbreadth doctrine is an ex-
ception to the principle that a person to whom a law may constitution-
ally be applied cannot challenge the law on the grounds that it may be
unconstitutionally applied to others.99 The reason for this exception is
that laws which trample on First Amendment liberties may go unchal-
lenged by those unconstitutionally affected because law-abiding citi-
zens will avoid the conduct rather than risk arrest. 10 0 The special
standing rule thus doesn't require people to place themselves between
a rock (punishment under the statute) and a hard place (sacrifice free
speech) to protect their First Amendment rights.' 0'
2. Loitering Laws and the Overbreadth Doctrine
Loitering laws are clear candidates for overbreadth challenges
because they often infringe on rights of assembly and association. 0 2
96. 482 U.S. 451 (1987).
97. The relevant portion of the ordinance read as follows: "(a) It shall be unlawful for any
person to assault, strike or in any manner oppose, molest, abuse or interrupt any policeman in
the execution of his duty, or any person summoned to aid in making an arrest." Id. at 455.
98. Id. at 466.
The Court premised its decision on several factors. First, the ordinance dealt with speech,
not criminal conduct. Id. at 460. Second, the ordinance criminalized abusive speech directed at
police officers, but the First Amendment protects many types of such speech, even when it is
directed at the police. Id. at 461. Third, the ordinance wasn't narrowly tailored to prohibit only
that abusive speech not protected by the First Amendment. I. at 465. Finally, for a reason
more characteristic of vagueness analysis, the ordinance afforded the police too much discretion
to determine when a violation occurred. Id. at 466.
99. Broadrick, 413 U.S. at 610.
100. The reason for such special protection is consistent with the Court's zealous protection
of First Amendment speech liberties:
It has long been recognized that the First Amendment needs breathing space and that
statutes attempting to restrict or burden the exercise of First Amendment rights must
be narrowly drawn and represent a considered legislative judgment that a particular
mode of expression has to give way to other compelling needs of society.
Id. at 611-12.
101. Id. at 612.
102. Trosch, supra note 16, at 538.
There are additional implicit rights that are infringed upon by typical loitering statutes.
These include liberties implicitly protected by the First and Fourteenth Amendments such as
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"[T]he right of the people peaceably to assemble" is explicitly pro-
tected by the First Amendment. 103 Loitering laws often violate the
"[t]he rights of locomotion, freedom of movement, to go where one pleases, and to use the
public streets in a way that does not interfere with the personal liberty of others." Bykofsky v.
Borough of Middletown, 401 F. Supp. 1242, 1254 (M.D. Pa. 1975), affd without opinion, 535 F.2d
1245 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 964 (1976). Also, some courts have decided that the act of
loitering itself is a constitutionally protected liberty. See, e.g., Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp.
974, 978 (M.D. Fla. 1983); City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1329 (Cleveland
(Ohio) Mun. Ct. 1987). Such constitutional protection for loitering presumably derives from the
following excerpt from Papachristou v. City of Jacksonvillo:
The difficulty is that [loafing and loitering] are historically part of the amenities of
life as we have known them. They are not mentioned in the Constitution or in the Bill
of Rights. These unwritten amenities have been in part responsible for giving our peo-
ple the feeling of independence and self-confidence, the feeling of creativity. These
amenities have dignified the right of dissent and have honored the right to be noncon-
formists and the right to defy submissiveness. They have encouraged lives of high spir-
its rather than hushed, suffocating silence.
405 U.S. at 164. While this passage certainly elevates loitering and loafing to a higher station
than they had previously enjoyed, the language does not confer upon anyone a constitutional
right to loiter and loaf for purposes of overbreadth analysis. Rather, an entirely different inter-
pretation is presented when this passage is taken in proper context. Namely, Papachristou was
about vagueness, not overbreadth. See id. at 170-71. No "right to loiter" was invented in
Papachristou; the Court merely noted that loitering was such an historically practiced, habitual,
seemingly innocent activity that to outlaw mere loitering failed to provide notice of what was
forbidden. Id. at 163 ("The Jacksonville ordinance makes criminal activities which by modem
standards are normally innocent."). This is somewhat akin to the Court's decision in Lambert v.
California, 355 U.S. 225 (1957) (striking down as violative of due process a Los Angeles ordi-
nance that made it illegal for a convicted felon not to register within five days of arriving in the
city because mere presence somewhere is typically of an innocent nature and because ordinary
citizens would never think that registration would be required). Thus, the Court's praise for
loitering in Papachristou is used to strike down the law for vagueness, not to confer yet another
unenumerated right upon the people.
One commentator took the passage from Papachristou even further and noted that the
"[clonstitutional freedoms associated with loitering are derived implicitly from the right to travel
as guaranteed under Article IV, Section 2, from the right to freedom of association under the
First Amendment, and from the general principles of the Constitution." Trosch, supra note 16,
at 551. One must be more careful than that when interpreting the above-quoted passage from
Papachristou. First, it is difficult to envision how the right to travel is connected to loitering.
Loitering, by its very definition, is standing around; not moving; not traveling. See supra note 15.
It is difficult to fabricate a connection between loitering and the Court's right to travel decisions.
See, e.g., Zobel v. Williams, 457 U.S. 55 (1982) (striking down an Alaskan statute that distributed
income derived from the state's natural resources to the state's citizens based on how long the
recipients had lived in the state); Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975) (upholding a one-year
residency requirement for divorce actions); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (striking
down residency requirements for welfare applicants). Second, if freedom of association gives
rise to a right to loiter, does that mean that single loiterers aren't protected? After all, where
there is no association-by its very definition, associations require two or more people-the
right to freedom of association cannot be violated.
What all of this boils down to is that just because loitering laws may sometimes affect these
freedoms, that doesn't mean that loitering itself is protected by these freedoms. Rather, a very
narrowly drafted loitering law may not conflict with any of these substantive constitutional
rights. Also, there is no reason to believe that loitering laws cannot overcome any procedural
infirmities if sufficient notice is given and if sufficient guidelines are drafted into a loitering
statute. But it is improper to take a procedural safeguard like the one the Court created in
Papachristou-and its predecessor Lambert-and turn it into yet another unenumerated sub-
stantive right, which is what most commentators and courts appear to be doing.
103. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
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assembly right by making it illegal for people to peaceably, innocently
assemble if the circumstances of that assembly are construed as illicit,
improper, or annoying by other members of society.1°4 This limitation
on assembly is unconstitutional:
The First and Fourteenth Amendments do not permit a State to
make criminal the exercise of the right of assembly simply because
its exercise may be "annoying" to some people. If this were not the
rule, the right of the people to gather in public places for social or
political purposes would be continually subject to summary suspen-
sion through the good-faith enforcement of a prohibition against an-
noying conduct.
1 5
Simply substitute "loitering" for "annoying" in that passage and it be-
comes easy to see that simple loitering laws can raise serious assem-
bly-restricting implications.
The freedom of association protects people and organizations
that gather together to engage in activities protected by the First
Amendment.1°6 Of course, only innocent associations are protected:
the Mafia cannot claim protection from racketeering charges under
the rubric of the freedom of association.10 7 However, the associations
need not necessarily be political to be protected by the freedom of
association. Protected associations include those associations which
"pertain to the social, legal, and economic benefit of the members.' 10 8
As a result, families, fraternal organizations, community service orga-
nizations, and the like are all protected in varying degrees by the free-
dom of association. 0 9
In Johnson v. Carson,"0 a federal district court struck down yet
another Jacksonville, Florida, loitering ordinance which prohibited
loitering for purposes of soliciting prostitution."' The Florida courts
had not previously limited the scope of the ordinance's plain mean-
ing.1 2 Thus, it was left to the district court to decide whether the
104. See, e.g., Johnson, 569 F. Supp. at 978.
105. Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 615 (1971).
106. Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 618 (1984).
107. See id.
108. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 483 (1965).
109. See Coates, 402 U.S. at 616.
110. 569 F. Supp. 974 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
111. Id. at 974-75.
The relevant portion of the ordinance, which delineated specific conduct, read as follows:
(b) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether this
purpose is manifested are that such a person (1) is a known prostitute, pimp, or
sodomist; (2) repeatedly beckons to, stops or attempts to stop or engages passers-by in
conversation; or (3) repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by
hailing, waving of arms or any bodily gesture.
Id. at 975 (emphasis deleted).
112. Id. at 978.
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statute regulated a substantial amount of protected activity. The court
noted that under the wording of the statute, people could be arrested
and convicted for such innocent activities as standing on the street
corner talking to passers-by.113 Additionally, known prostitutes could
be arrested for such innocent activities as window shopping, standing
on the street waiting for a bus, or merely standing in a public place
doing absolutely nothing. 114 The statute was struck down for being
overbroad because of such chilling effects on those First Amendment
activities.1
15
In City of Cleveland v. Howard,116 a similar ordinance survived an
overbreadth challenge. However, the Cleveland ordinance had some-
thing the Jacksonville ordinance did not have-an intent require-
ment.11 7 Though the illicit conduct enumerated in the Cleveland
ordinance was virtually identical to the illicit conduct enumerated in
the Jacksonville ordinance," 8 the Cleveland ordinance's intent re-
quirement precluded the police from arresting people without consid-
ering the totality of the circumstances." 9 In essence, a person could
be arrested under the Jacksonville ordinance merely for exhibiting
one of the enumerated modes of conduct, 20 while the Cleveland po-
lice could only arrest people under their city's ordinance after consid-
ering the totality of the surrounding circumstances and determining
that the person in question actually was loitering for the purpose of
soliciting prostitution.' 2 ' As such, known prostitutes could not legiti-
mately be arrested or convicted under the Cleveland ordinance for
window shopping or for gathering in public with others. Accordingly,
the court held that First Amendment rights were protected under the
Cleveland ordinance because the ordinance explicitly applied only to




115. Id. at 979-80.
116. 532 N.E.2d 1325 (Cleveland (Ohio) Mun. Ct. 1987).
117. Id. at 1329.
118. For example, both ordinances list repeatedly beckoning to passers-by and repeatedly
stopping or attempting to stop motor vehicles as conduct manifesting a purpose to engage in
solicitation. Id. at 1326; Johnson, 569 F. Supp. at 975.
119. Howard, 532 N.E.2d at 1329.
120. Johnson, 569 F. Supp. at 978. The Jacksonville ordinance did have an intent require-
ment. Id. at 975. However, that intent requirement could be inferred solely from the enumer-
ated conduct. Id. at 978. Thus the court concluded that the ordinance could really be inflicted
on people so long as the enumerated conduct was observed. Id.




C. Fourth Amendment Requirements
1. Fourth Amendment Doctrine
The Fourth Amendment guarantees that "no [w]arrants shall is-
sue, but upon probable cause."'123 The probable cause requirement
gives the judiciary independent review over police practices by ensur-
ing that police officers arrest people only when there is probable cause
to believe that a crime is going to be committed, is being committed,
or has been committed.124 Arrests not based on probable cause are
invalid. 125
There are several exceptions to the probable cause requirement.
In Terry v. Ohio,126 the United States Supreme Court created the rea-
sonable suspicion exception in upholding a police officer's frisk of a
suspect where there was no probable cause to believe that a crime was
being committed.127 The Court applied a Fourth Amendment balanc-
ing test that weighs the government's interest in the search against the
privacy invasion the search presents to the individual. 28 The Court
concluded that the government's interest in protecting police officers
and in preventing crime outweighed the minimal intrusion caused by a
brief detention and frisk.129 However, the frisk is allowed only when
the officer has a reasonable suspicion, based on articulable facts, that
the suspect is armed and dangerous. 130 Moreover, the detention itself
may last no longer than is required for the police officer to ensure that
no criminal activity is afoot.131
123. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
124. Hallock, supra note 54, at 1064.
125. See Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200, 216 (1979); Papachristou v. City of Jackson-
ville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 479-82 (1963); United
States ex reL Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166, 1173 (2d Cir. 1974).
126. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
127. Id. at 20.
128. Id. at 20-22.
129. IM. at 30.
130. Id.
131. Id. There are three other exceptions to the probable cause requirement. In Camara v.
Municipal Court, 387 U.S. 523 (1967), the Supreme Court allowed searches for administrative
safety inspections in the absence of individualized suspicion that the place searched has violated,
or is violating, safety and health standards. The Court justified these searches on the grounds
that they were made to enforce safety codes, not to uncover evidence of criminal acts. Id. at 537.
The second exception is an expansion of the administrative search. Thus, non-personal
searches need not comply with the probable cause requirement so long as they are conducted as
safety measures rather than as criminal investigative tools. See, e.g., United States v. Villamonte-
Marquez, 462 U.S. 579 (1983) (holding that the probable cause requirement does not apply to
documents searched aboard oceangoing vessels); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981) (hold-
ing that the warrantless inspection of highly regulated mining industry operations does not vio-
late the Fourth Amendment).
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Though the Terry doctrine permits limited detention based solely
upon a reasonable suspicion that crime is afoot, the doctrine does not
grant the police the authority to actually arrest the suspect. Recent
expansions of the doctrine have loosened probable cause require-
ments for other minimal intrusions, but only for those intrusions
which amount to less than a full-scale arrest.132 The probable cause
requirement is still interpreted to prohibit both arrests 133 and convic-
tions134 based solely on suspicion.
35
Keeping that in mind, it next becomes necessary to define prob-
able cause. The Supreme Court has defined the probable cause re-
quired for a search as "a fair probability that contraband or evidence
of a crime will be found.' 36 Because it would be impractical to re-
duce this definition to a "neat set of legal rules,"'137 the test for mea-
suring the presence of probable cause in a given situation is to look at
the totality of the circumstances 38 and decide if there is a "probability
or substantial chance of criminal activity."'
1 39
Under the totality of the circumstances approach, there are in-
stances where wholly innocent behavior may at least give rise to a
suspicion that criminal activity is afoot'0 and may even "provide the
The third exception scraps the probable cause requirement for searches and seizures in
schools in favor of a reasonable suspicion standard. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325 (1985).
This exception is justified on the grounds that teachers need flexibility to maintain order in the
schoolhouse environment. Id. at 339-40.
None of these three exceptions applies to loitering laws. The first two are irrelevant to the
issue at hand because they specifically do not apply to criminal investigations. The third excep-
tion obviously does not apply because loitering isn't limited to the schoolhouse environment.
See Trosch, supra note 16, at 556 n.338.
132. The Court's most recent forays into Terry involve investigative stops where law enforce-
ment authorities stop and temporarily detain people suspected of smuggling narcotics. The
Court has been quite willing to uphold such brief detentions based solely on reasonable suspi-
cion. However, the Court still requires that arrests be predicated on probable cause. See, e.g.,
United States v. Sokolow, 490 U.S. 1 (1989); United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544 (1980).
133. E.g., Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963); Henry v. United States, 361 U.S.
98 (1959).
134. E.g., Stoutenburgh v. Frazier, 16 App. D.C. 229 (1900).
135. See Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 226-28.
136. Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 238 (1983).
137. Id. at 232.
138. Id. at 230-31.
139. Id. at 243 n.13. The Court justified this expansive approach as follows:
The process [of determining probable cause] does not deal with hard certainties,
but with probabilities. Long before the law of probabilities was articulated as such,
practical people formulated certain common sense conclusions about human behavior;
jurors as factfinders are permitted to do the same--and so are law enforcement officers.
United States v. Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418 (1981) (emphasis added).
140. See Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438, 441 (1980) (per curiam) (stating that there may "be




basis for a showing of probable cause. ' 141 This is because when deter-
mining probable cause, "the relevant inquiry is not whether particular
conduct is 'innocent' or 'guilty,' but the degree of suspicion that at-
taches to particular types of non-criminal acts."'142 However, as broad
as this approach may at first appear, there must be at least "some
minimal level of objective justification"'143 to satisfy the Fourth
Amendment.
2. Loitering Laws and the Fourth Amendment
Vagrancy and loitering laws have historically allowed, in two dis-
tinct senses, arrests and convictions based on suspicion. 44 First, loi-
terers may be arrested for suspicions of past criminality. 45 In this
way, the loitering laws give police a chance to investigate whether the
suspect is wanted elsewhere or has committed other crimes. 146 How-
ever, in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the Court said that arrest-
ing people on suspicions based on past criminality is not compatible
with the probable cause requirement. 47 Second, loiterers may be ar-
rested for suspected future criminality. 148 This is the justification for
present American vagrancy and loitering laws. Such arrests based on
suspicion also suffer from probable cause deficiencies.
In Farber v. Rochford,149 a federal district court struck down a
Chicago, Illinois, loitering ordinance for violating the constitutional
doctrines of vagueness, overbreadth, status, and probable cause.'
50
The ordinance made it a crime for known drunkards, drug addicts,
prostitutes, pimps, and convicted felons to congregate together in pub-
lic or to loiter in places serving alcoholic beverages. 151 The plaintiff
was arrested for loitering in a hotel bar, though she had never previ-
ously been arrested for, or convicted of, any of the crimes delineated
in the ordinance. 52 She responded to the arrest by challenging the
constitutionality of the ordinance and by seeking monetary damages
141. Gates, 462 U.S. at 241-45, 245 n.13.
142. Id. at 245 n.13.
143. INS v. Delgado, 466 U.S. 210, 217 (1984).
144. Id. at 226.
145. Caleb Foote, Vagrancy-Type Law and Its Administration, 104 U. PA. L. REv. 603, 625
(1956).
146. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 226-27.
147. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 169 (1972).
148. Foote, supra note 145, at 625.
149. 407 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. Ill. 1975).
150. Id. at 531.
151. Id. at 530.
152. Id. at 530-31.
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for violations of her civil rights stemming from her arrest under the
ordinance. 153 The court agreed with her constitutional challenges and
struck down the ordinance.
154
The Fourth Amendment discussion in Farber is illustrative of the
difficulties facing loitering ordinances. In Farber, the defendants ar-
gued that the ordinance didn't undermine the probable cause require-
ment.155 But the court disagreed, noting that "ordinance[s] of this
nature inevitably preclude[ ] application of probable cause" because
they are directed at suspected conduct rather than at observable con-
duct.156 Even police officers who act in good faith cannot justify ar-
rests under such an ordinance with the probable cause requirement.
57
This doesn't mean, however, that loitering laws can never meet
Fourth Amendment requirements. Rather, the Fourth Amendment
deficiencies usually stem from the close connection between the
vagueness doctrine and the probable cause requirement. 58 Stated
simply, laws that fail to provide the police with reasonable criteria
upon which to base an arrest also typically deny the police grounds
upon which to form a probable cause belief that a crime is being com-
mitted.159 Conversely, laws that provide clear, reasonable criteria to
believe that a crime is being, or is about to be, committed provide
police reasonable criteria upon which to justify an arrest consistent
with the demands of the Fourth Amendment. Thus, laws that meet




Starting with the Scottsboro Boys, 160 the United States Supreme
Court has greatly expanded procedural protections in criminal
cases. 161 However, the Court generally didn't review substantive
153. Id. at 531.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 533.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See Powell v. Stone, 507 F.2d 93, 96-97 (9th Cir. 1974), rev'd on other grounds, 428 U.S.
465 (1976); see also Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-71 (1972).
159. Stone, 507 F.2d at 96-97.
160. The Scottsboro Boys case is the infamous episode where multiple black defendants were
convicted in a circus atmosphere of raping two white women. The defendants appealed their
convictions, and in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), the Supreme Court insisted that states
provide legal counsel to poor defendants in capital cases.
161. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at 234.
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criminal law.162 That changed with the Court's decision in Robinson
v. California.
163
In Robinson, the defendant was convicted of violating a Califor-
nia law that made it illegal to be a drug addict.164 The Court struck
down the law as violative of the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause and reversed the defendant's conviction. 165
The Court noted that the California law made the defendant's sta-
tus-drug addict-a criminal offense regardless of whether the de-
fendant had ever possessed or taken illegal drugs within the state's
borders. 166 The Court likened such status criminalization to criminal-
izing mental illness or leprosy.167 Though a state may legitimately
compel treatment for such illnesses, such conditions may not be made
crimes in and of themselves. 168 "[C]riminal penalties may be inflicted
only if the accused . . . has committed some actus reus."'
1 69
The Robinson decision is noteworthy for two reasons. First, it
incorporated the Eighth Amendment into the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, thus making the cruel and unusual punishment clause applica-
ble to the states. 70 Second, the decision expanded the meaning of the
cruel and unusual punishment clause to preclude the government
from criminalizing certain areas not otherwise protected by the Bill of
Rights. 17
1
The impact of Robinson was subsequently limited by the Court's
decision in Powell v. Texas.172 The defendant in Powell was convicted
162. Id.
163. 370 U.S. 660, reh'g denied, 371 U.S. 905 (1962).
164. Id. at 660-61.
165. Id. at 666-68.
166. Id. at 665.
167. Id. at 666.
168. Id.
169. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 533 (1968) (explaining the meaning of the Robinson
decision).
170. Robinson, 370 U.S. at 666.
171. Id. Professor Amsterdam noted that Robinson was apparently predicated on substan-
tive due process, not on the cruel and unusual punishment clause. Amsterdam, supra note 9, at
234. However, the cruel and unusual punishment clause has had some quite diverse applications.
The Court's decision in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40 (1972), struck down various
death penalty statutes for violating both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, mainly be-
cause the death penalty was so arbitrarily and discriminatorily administered. See WILLIAM J.
BOWERS, LEGAL HOMICIDE 20 (1984). The cruel and unusual punishment clause was also men-
tioned or applied in certain cases as a potential restriction on excessive criminal sentences. See,
e.g., Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring); Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S.
277 (1983), overruled by Harmelin v. Michigan, 111 S. Ct. 2680 (1991). Thus, given the flexibility
of the cruel and unusual punishment clause, it is unclear whether Professor Amsterdam was
correct.
172. 392 U.S. at 514.
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of public drunkenness. 173 His defense was that he was a chronic alco-
holic who couldn't control himself when intoxicated. 174 Thus, he
claimed, the statute punished him for his alcoholic status, rather than
for volitional conduct, in violation of the Robinson decision. 175 The
Court disagreed.176 The Court said that the Texas statute didn't suffer
the same infirmity as the California drug addict statute; namely, the
Texas statute didn't make illegal the status of alcoholism, but made
illegal the act of appearing in public while drunk.177 Therefore, non-
alcoholics could also be punished under the Texas statute if they ap-
peared in public while drunk. 78 The California drug addict statute,
on the other hand, made illegal the specified status in the absence of
any actus reus.179 In short, Powell stands for the proposition that a
state may criminalize acts that stem from an individual's status so long
as the state does not criminalize status alone.
2. Loitering Laws and the Status Doctrine
Loitering laws must be carefully drafted to avoid criminalizing
mere status. The easiest way to do this is to include an actus reus
element in the statute. Statutes with no actus reus element run the
risk of being held unconstitutional.
Farber v. Rochford demonstrated how loitering ordinances may
violate the cruel and unusual punishment clause by improperly
criminalizing status. In Farber, the court struck down the Chicago loi-
tering ordinance, in part, because it criminalized a person's status in
the absence of some criminal act.'80 The defendants argued that the
ordinance didn't criminalize the status of being a drug addict, drunk,
prostitute, or pimp;18' rather, they argued, the ordinance criminalized
the conduct of such people congregating together or loitering in
bars. 82 The court didn't buy that argument because, the court noted,
173. Id. at 517.
174. Id. Powell's chronic alcoholism was clearly shown when the defense proved that Powell
had been convicted of public intoxication approximately 100 times in seventeen years. Id. at 555
(Fortas, J., dissenting).
175. Id. at 517.
176. Id. at 531-37.
177. Id. at 532.
178. Id.
179. Id. at 533.





congregating with others and loitering in bars are both typically inno-
cent actions that cannot constitute an actus reus.'83
The court then distinguished the actus reus requirement in the
Chicago ordinance from the actus reus requirement found sufficient in
Powell v. Texas.184 The Texas statute could punish an alcoholic who
ventured into public while intoxicated, but the statute didn't punish
alcoholics who ventured into public while sober.'8 5 The Chicago ordi-
nance, however, placed suspected prostitutes, pimps, drug addicts, and
alcoholics in jeopardy of arrest any time they left their house. 86 Thus,
the Chicago ordinance "[sought] a shortcut, and shortcuts cannot tres-
pass across constitutional rights.' 87
III. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGES AND SOLUTIONS TO
ANTIGANG LOITERING ORDINANCES
Though loitering laws face many different constitutional chal-
lenges, legislatures may still want such laws to give law enforcement
authorities a powerful tool to prevent criminal street gang activities.
To accomplish this purpose, loitering laws must be carefully drafted to
avoid constitutional challenges common to statutes of this nature.
However, this being a case of first impression, to envision constitu-
tional requirements for antigang loitering laws, it is prudent to first
examine one such law-the Chicago antigang loitering ordinance-
and its constitutional shortcomings. Only then can a constitutional
means be developed to stem criminal street gang activities through
loitering laws.
A. The Constitution v. The Chicago Loitering Ordinance
The Chicago antigang loitering ordinance was enacted by the City
Council only after a long and heated debate. 88 The Council enacted
the ordinance primarily to help police deal with a rising murder rate
attributed to the growing influence of criminal street gangs. 189 The
Council officially noted that one of the methods by which criminal
183. Id.
184. Id. at 534.
185. See Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 517 (1968).
186. Farber, 407 F. Supp. at 530.
187. Johnson v. Carson, 569 F. Supp. 974, 979 (M.D. Fla. 1983).
188. Middleton, supra note 45, at 3.
189. Amendment of Title 8, Chapters 4 and 16 of Municipal Code of Chicago by Implementa-
tion of Restrictions on Gang Related Congregations in Public Ways and by Expansion of Curfew




street gangs control an area is loitering in that area and intimidating
the local citizenry.190 Gang members easily avoid arrest for such con-
duct by doing nothing overtly illegal when police officers are
nearby.191 To remedy this problem, the Council enacted an ordinance
that basically makes it illegal for criminal gang members to stand
around in public and do nothing.' 92 Unfortunately, this well inten-
tioned, much needed ordinance is almost certainly unconstitutional.
1. The Chicago Loitering Ordinance and the Vagueness Doctrine
The Chicago antigang loitering ordinance clearly violates the
vagueness doctrine. The first constitutional problem with the ordi-
nance is that its definition of loitering fails the vagueness test.193 The
Chicago ordinance defines "loitering" as "remain[ing] in any one
place with no apparent purpose.' 94 The problem with such a broad
definition isn't that it's "an imprecise but comprehensible normative
standard; [rather] it specifies no standard at all, because one may
190. Id.
191. Id.
192. The City Council enunciated the reasons for passing the antigang loitering ordinance:
WHEREAS, The City of Chicago, like other cities across the nation, has been
experiencing an increasing murder rate as well as an increase in violent and drug re-
lated crimes; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that the continuing increase in
criminal street gang activity in the City is largely responsible for this unacceptable situ-
ation; and
WHEREAS, In many neighborhoods throughout the City, the burgeoning pres-
ence of street gang members in public places has intimidated many law-abiding citizens;
and
WHEREAS, One of the methods by which criminal street gangs establish control
over identifiable areas is by loitering in those areas and intimidating others from enter-
ing those areas; and
WHEREAS, Members of criminal street gangs avoid arrest by committing no of-
fense punishable under existing laws when they know police are present, while main-
taining control over identifiable areas by continued loitering; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has determined that loitering in public places by
criminal street gang members creates a justifiable fear for the safety of persons and
property in the area because of the violence, drug-dealing and vandalism often associ-
ated with such activity; and
WHEREAS, The City also has an interest in discouraging all persons from loiter-
ing in public places with criminal gang members; and
WHEREAS, Aggressive action is necessary to preserve the City's streets and
other public places so that the public may use such places without fear; and
WHEREAS, The City Council has also determined that it is necessary to amend
the Municipal Code of Chicago to provide for a stronger curfew ordinance and a more
effective means of enforcement; ....
Id. at 18,293-94.
193. See supra part II.A.
194. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(1) (emphasis added).
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never know in advance what [actions constitute a violation of the
statute]."1
95
Laws that make illegal standing around and doing nothing violate
both prongs of the vagueness test.196 Notice is not provided where a
law is so all-inclusive as to actually criminalize doing absolutely noth-
ing because people aren't realistically given a prior opportunity to tai-
lor their conduct appropriately.1 97 Nor can minimal guidelines
harnessing police discretion be derived by reading the clear language
of the ordinance. Rather, guidelines are starkly and intentionally ab-
sent so that the ordinance can accomplish its main purpose-"provide
... a more effective means of [law] enforcement .... 198
The Chicago ordinance is also unconstitutionally vague in its rea-
sonable belief requirement. First, the reasonable belief requirement
fails to afford adequate notice of who is subject to arrest.199 Granted,
the ordinance defines what a criminal gang member is and what con-
stitutes criminal gang activity. 20° However, the ordinance doesn't de-
fine what personal characteristics differentiate criminal gang members
from law-abiding members of the community. A person's reputation
is apparently what the Chicago Police Department will rely on when
enforcing the ordinance.20' Yet, people cannot constitutionally be ar-
rested, let alone convicted, for their reputation.20 2 Apparently, to
conform with the law people must accurately guess whether the police
think that either they or whomever they are congregating with are
criminal gang members. Laws cannot constitutionally require people
195. TRIBE, supra note 57, § 12-32. The Chicago ordinance's loitering definition is analogous
to the ordinance struck down in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611 (1971), which is the
ordinance Professor Tribe discusses in his text. The ordinance in Coates made it illegal for "three
or more persons to assemble [in public and] . . . conduct themselves in a manner annoying to
persons passing by .... " Id. at 611 n.1. The Court declared the ordinance unconstitutionally
vague "because it subjects the exercise of the right of assembly to an unascertainable standard
.. " Id. at 614.
196. See id.
197. Of course, it can be argued that merely doing something-anything-would place the
loiterer outside of the definition. This misses the point. The problem isn't necessarily that stand-
ing idly is now illegal in Chicago if one happens to look like a gang member; the problem is that
because there is no conduct specified at all by the ordinance, people have no idea how to act.
Ergo, insufficient notice.
198. Floor Debates, supra note 189, at 18,294.
199. This means that people cannot change their behavior prior to arousing police suspicions.
See supra text accompanying notes 51-52.
200. CHICAO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(2), (3).
201. Middleton, supra note 45, at 3.
202. Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529, 532 (N.D. Ill. 1975); People v. Belcastro, 190 N.E.
301, 303 (Ill. 1934).
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to have psychic powers to know what is forbidden. Such deficiencies
are what the notice requirement was developed to remedy.20 3
The Chicago ordinance also runs afoul of the second and more
important component of the vagueness doctrine: the ordinance fails
to provide minimal guidelines upon which the police may base their
reasonable suspicions.2°4 The Chicago Police Department has stated
that it will only enforce this ordinance if it can document that the ar-
restee has been previously arrested for crimes that constitute criminal
gang activity. 20 5 Yet, even an approach as narrow as that is seriously
flawed. The Department doesn't require documentation that the ar-
restees have been convicted of the specified crimes; it is enough that
the arrestees have, in the past, been arrested.206 Thus, the Department
will still be premising its enforcement of the ordinance, at least in part,
on the suspect's reputation.20 7 Such an approach can quickly lead to
discriminatory enforcement against young males-particularly those
who belong to minority groups-who at some time in their past were
mistakenly arrested for inadvertently wearing gang colors, for associ-
ating with the "wrong" people, or for otherwise arousing a police of-
ficer's suspicions.208 It is doubtful that such transgressions merited
arrest when they occurred;209 they certainly don't merit repeated har-
assment under the loitering ordinance.
Nor can the city argue that the loitering ordinance isn't vague
because it adequately warns people that they will be arrested only if
they ignore a police officer's orders to disperse. 210 Such an argument
misses the point of the vagueness doctrine: notice is required so that
people may conform their behavior to the law before the law is en-
forced against them.211 This ordinance allows no opportunity for peo-
ple to conform their behavior until the order to disperse is given.212
More importantly, the dispersion requirement is insufficient to save
the ordinance from a vagueness challenge because the police have too
203. And that's what explicit standards are for, too. See Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408
U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972); Coates v. City of Cincinnati, 402 U.S. 611, 614 (1971); Farber, 407 F.
Supp. at 532-33.
204. See supra notes 55-58 and accompanying text.
205. Middleton, supra note 45, at 3.
206. See id.
207. See supra text accompanying note 202.
208. This raises grave issues pertaining to equal protection analysis. See Amsterdam, supra
note 9, at 229-33.
209. See supra text accompanying notes 110-15, 149-57.
210. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(a).
211. See Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529, 531 (N.D. I1. 1975) ("An ordinary citizen
should be able to act with certainty as to the legal effect of his conduct.").
212. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(a).
19931
CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW
much discretion when determining when the order to disperse is war-
ranted, thus offending the minimal guidelines requirement.213 The
vagueness doctrine doesn't apply only to those situations where ar-
restees are actually convicted; the doctrine is also implicated where
the police's power is so broad as to chill First Amendment free-
doms.214 Relying solely on the police's "[i]nstinct with its ever-present
potential for arbitrarily suppressing First Amendment liberties .. .
bears the hallmark of a police state.
'215
2. The Chicago Loitering Ordinance and the Overbreadth
Doctrine
The Chicago antigang loitering ordinance is substantially over-
broad because it impermissibly restricts First Amendment liberties.
The Court in Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville granted limited con-
stitutional protection to simple loitering.216 Yet, the Chicago ordi-
nance makes it illegal for certain people to engage in such simple
loitering.
217
The Chicago ordinance's overbreadth problems don't end with its
loitering definition. Rather, the ordinance offends the overbreadth
doctrine in another way: it requires only one member of a group to be
a suspected criminal gang member for the dispersion order to be trig-
gered, but the dispersion order extends to all others gathered in the
group regardless of whether those others are criminal gang mem-
bers.218 Thus, the ordinance makes it a crime for innocent people to
associate in public with criminal gang members even for completely
legal purposes. And, of course, since the ordinance doesn't tell any-
one what a criminal gang member looks like, no one knows with
whom they can legally associate. 219 However, even if the ordinance
told us what a criminal gang member looks like for the purposes of the
ordinance, the City Council still cannot make it illegal for upstanding
citizens to innocently associate with suspected criminal gang members.
The words of the ordinance and the City Council's explicit intent
220
make illegal such commendable actions as trying to reform criminal
gang members. Indeed, since no one may associate in public with a
213. See Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham, 382 U.S. 87, 90-91 (1965).
214. See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 466-67 (1987).
215. Shuttlesworth, 382 U.S. at 90-91.
216. 405 U.S. 156, 164 (1972); see also supra note 102.
217. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(1).
218. Id. § 8-4-015(a).
219. See supra text accompanying notes 193-97.
220. See Floor Debates, supra note 189, at 18,293.
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criminal gang member, the ordinance makes it a crime for parents of
suspected criminal gang members to associate with their suspected-
renegade children in public.
As a result, both the core conduct made illegal by the ordi-
nance-suspected criminal gang members and their cronies standing
around doing absolutely nothing-and the fringe conduct made illegal
by the plain meaning and intent of the ordinance-innocent people
associating with suspected criminal gang members-are also restric-
tions on the freedoms of assembly and association.221 Those freedoms
may not constitutionally be restricted in this manner. Thus, the Chi-
cago ordinance is substantially overbroad.
3. The Chicago Loitering Ordinance and the Fourth Amendment
The Chicago antigang loitering ordinance violates the Fourth
Amendment's probable cause requirement because it permits arrests
and convictions premised solely on reasonable suspicion. The words
of the statute do not require the police to have a probable cause belief
that the arrestee is a criminal gang member. Rather, the police need
only have a reasonable suspicion that one of the arrestees is a criminal
gang member.222 The burden of proof is then placed on the arrestees
to demonstrate that no one in the arrested group is a criminal gang
member.223 While Terry v. Ohio permits brief detention and limited
frisks predicated on reasonable suspicion,224 neither arrests nor con-
victions can ever be predicated solely on reasonable suspicion. 225
Granted, the Chicago ordinance has two other elements that require a
probable cause belief: the loitering element and the failure to disperse
element.226 However, this doesn't save the ordinance from a Fourth
Amendment challenge because the police must have a probable cause
belief that all three elements of the offense-loitering, criminal gang
221. See supra notes 106-09 and accompanying text.
222. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
223. See id. at § 8-4-015(b). Granted, the ordinance calls this an affirmative defense rather
than an initial shift of the burden of proof. Id. However, nothing in the ordinance requires law
enforcement officials to ever have even a probable cause belief-let alone the burden of proving
beyond a reasonable doubt-that the defendant is a criminal gang member. Id. Therefore, it
can only be assumed that it's not necessary for one to be a criminal gang member to be convicted
of this offense. But if that's the case, then why is there a reasonable suspicion requirement?
And why is there an extensive listing of what constitutes a criminal gang and criminal gang
activity?
224. 392 U.S. 1, 30 (1968).
225. See supra text accompanying notes 120-22.
226. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(a).
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member status, and failure to disperse 227-have been violated before
an arrest may constitutionally occur.
Additionally, the courts must find proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that all three elements have been fulfilled before convicting a
defendant of violating the ordinance. But the Chicago ordinance re-
quires the courts to find transgressions of two of the elements, while
the burden of disproving the gang member status element is placed
squarely with the defendant. 228 In this way, the Chicago ordinance is
caught between the Scylla (allowing arrests and convictions based on
reasonable suspicion) and Charybdis (convicting people for loitering
or for disobeying a dispersion order in violation of Papachristou
v. City of Jacksonville and Shuttlesworth v. City of Birmingham,
respectively).
By failing to provide the police with objective criteria upon which
to base probable cause, the ordinance's vagueness contributes to its
Fourth Amendment shortcomings. 229 The probable cause require-
ment could be at least partially met if the ordinance contained a list of
specific conduct upon which to base a probable cause belief that a
crime is about to be, or is being, committed.230 However, the Chicago
ordinance contains no such conduct element231 because such a list
would only undermine the ordinance's purpose of giving the police
virtually unfettered discretion in stemming criminal gang activity
while giving the people no notice of what types of conduct to avoid.232
4. The Chicago Loitering Ordinance and the Status Doctrine
Finally, the Chicago antigang loitering ordinance probably runs
afoul of the Eighth Amendment's prohibition of status offenses.233
The Chicago ordinance bases arrests and convictions on suspected
criminal gang member status; an actus reus element is conspicuously
absent from the ordinance.234 As a matter of fact, the ordinance spe-
cifically precludes an actus reus requirement because, pursuant to the
loitering definition, doing nothing is illegal.235 Thus, this ordinance
227. See id.
228. See id. at § 8-4-015(a)-(b).
229. See Trosch, supra note 16, at 559-60.
230. See infra part III.B.l.b.
231. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
232. See Floor Debates, supra note 189, at 18,293-94.
233. See supra part II.D.
234. CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
235. Id at § 8-4-015(c)(1).
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violates the Supreme Court's holding in Robinson v. California that
people cannot be punished solely for their status.
Powell v. Texas doesn't save the Chicago ordinance. Granted, the
ordinance can even be enforced against Pope John Paul II should he
ever make the mistake of associating with a suspected criminal gang
member for the purpose of trying to reform the suspected member.
However, unlike the defendant in Powell,236 everyone who loiters and
then ignores a dispersion order cannot be arrested and convicted.
Rather, suspected criminal gang members and those with whom they
associate in public are singled out for punishment even though no
overt act, innocent or otherwise, need be committed. 237 Again, the
ordinance is caught between a rock (punishing suspected criminal
gang members solely for being suspected criminal gang members) and
a hard place (punishing suspected criminal gang members and those
with whom they associate for exercising their First Amendment lib-
erty of Association). The former is prohibited by the cruel and unu-
sual punishment clause; the latter is unconstitutionally overbroad.
B. A Constitutional Antigang Loitering Statute
Of course, the first question to answer is whether loitering laws in
any form are still a constitutionally viable means of preventing crime.
As has been shown, constitutional challenges are not limited to anti-
gang loitering laws alone.238 All manner of loitering laws are prone to
various legitimate constitutional challenges. Moreover, most scholarly
writings condemn loitering laws for their constitutional shortcuts.239
However, governing bodies still enact all kinds of loitering laws and
the courts, in turn, have upheld many of those laws.24° Thus, regard-
less of what the scholars say, loitering laws per se are constitutionally
valid so long as they are carefully drafted to avoid constitutional
deficiencies.
Now that there's no doubt that valid loitering laws do exist, it
seems necessary to identify the constitutional deficiencies common to
loitering laws. As should be clear by now, there are only a few sec-
tions of loitering laws that are closely scrutinized. Those sections can
236. Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 532 (1968).
237. See id. at 533.
238. See, e.g., supra parts II.A.2, II.B.2, II.C.2, II.D.2.
239. See Amsterdam, supra note 9; Berns, supra note 8; Trosch, supra note 16; Yeamans,
supra note 9.
240. See City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325 (Cleveland (Ohio) Mun. Ct. 1987);




be generally categorized as the intent element,241 the conduct ele-
ment,242 and the probable cause requirement. 243 Granted, there are
many other things that may still render a loitering law unconstitu-
tional. However, those other constitutional infirmities are not usually
limited to, or specifically related to, loitering laws. For example, the
vagueness doctrine isn't limited to loitering statutes; all laws must
meet at least some minimum level of specificity to survive constitu-
tional scrutiny. With this in mind, it seems necessary only to describe
the pitfalls endemic to loitering laws and to question how such pitfalls
may apply to antigang loitering laws.
1. The Constitutional Pitfalls of Loitering Laws
a. The Intent Element
Since Justice Douglas wrote about an intent element in
Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, the courts have latched onto this
factor when determining whether a loitering law passes the vagueness
test.244 The outcome of such cases is predictable: loitering laws that
have an intent element usually pass vagueness muster while loitering
laws without an intent element are presumptively unconstitutional.
245
Thus, intent elements are a common characteristic of nearly every
constitutional loitering statute.
246
The intent element serves several vital, interrelated functions.
First, it harnesses police discretion by allowing arrests only when peo-
ple exhibit an intent to commit the act that the loitering ordinance is
aimed at preventing.247 Second, the intent element gives people no-
tice that loitering with the specified illegal intent is forbidden.248 The
simple addition of an intent element thus goes a long way towards
curing a statute's vagueness problems.
Drafting an intent element into an antigang loitering ordinance-
or any loitering statute, for that matter-isn't nearly as simple as it
would initially appear. Antiprostitution loitering laws are aimed at
241. See infra part III.B.l.a.
242. See infra part III.B.l.b.
243. See infra part III.B.1.c.
244. See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 242 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); City of
Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Wis. 1980); People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1035
(N.Y. 1978).
245. See Northern Virginia Chapter, ACLU v. City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. 324, 326-27
(E.D. Va. 1990).
246. Id. at 327.




preventing only one type of crime-prostitution. Thus, one would
reasonably deduce, drafting such a loitering law would be far simpler
a task than drafting a multi-faceted antigang loitering ordinance such
as the Chicago ordinance. Yet, even intent elements in antiprostitu-
tion loitering laws have had their problems. In Coleman v. City of
Richmond,249 a Virginia appellate court struck down the city's an-
tiprostitution loitering ordinance because the intent element was un-
constitutional for either vagueness or overbreadth. The intent
element prohibited loitering "in a manner or under circumstances
manifesting the purpose of engaging in prostitution. . . ."25 The law
then detailed several circumstances that the police could consider
when determining whether someone manifested the requisite in-
tent.251 The court said that there were two possible interpretations of
such an intent element, and that both interpretations were bad.
252
First, engaging in the enumerated circumstances could, by itself, fulfill
the intent element. 253 In that case, the intent element would be un-
constitutionally overbroad since the enumerated circumstances in-
cluded constitutionally protected activities.254  Second, the
enumerated "circumstances [could be viewed] ... only as suggestions
for what kinds of conduct might manifest an intent to engage in prosti-
tution, but [would] not by themselves [be] sufficient to prove intent
.... 255 In which case the intent element would be unconstitutionally
vague because if the enumerated circumstances alone couldn't fulfill
the intent element, then they "are not relevant to the constitutional
inquiry as they have no force of law."256 Thus stripped of the enumer-
ated circumstances, the statute failed to provide notice of what, other
than loitering with an unlawful intent, was prohibited.
249. 364 S.E.2d 239 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
250. Id. at 242.
251. Id. Those circumstances were as follows:
(i) that, to the knowledge of the arresting officer at the time of arrest, such individual
has within one year prior to the date of arrest been convicted of any offense chargeable
under this section, or under any other section of this Code or the Code of Virginia,
relating to prostitution, pandering, or any act proscribed as lewd, lascivious or indecent;
(ii) that such individual repeatedly beckons to, stops, attempts to stop, or interferes
with the free passage of other persons, or repeatedly attempts to engage in conversa-
tion with passersby or individuals in stopped or passing vehicles; or (iii) that such indi-
vidual repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehicle operators by hailing, waving
arms, or other bodily gestures.
Id. (quoting RICHMOND, VA., CODE § 20-83(a)).







If the intent element can be so tricky for loitering statutes that
seek to prevent only one crime, it's easy to see how the intent element
can quickly derail antigang loitering statutes, which seek to prevent a
multitude of crimes. Of course, an antigang loitering ordinance could
include an intent element for each and every crime it seeks to prevent,
but this would create several problems. First, the intent elements
must all be carefully drafted to avoid vagueness and overbreadth
problems such as those encountered in Coleman v. City of Rich-
mond.257 Second, the very use of such an omnibus measure may cast
too large a net in violation of the most basic precept of the vagueness
doctrine,258 which was the heart of the Court's decision in Papachris-
tou v. City of Jacksonville.
b. The Conduct Element
Most constitutionally valid loitering statutes contain lists of overt
acts upon which the police and the courts may base arrests and convic-
tions.259 These conduct lists typically contain actions commonly associ-
ated with the crimes the statute seeks to prevent.26° For example, an
antiprostitution loitering statute's conduct list could contain such ac-
tions as repeatedly trying to engage passers-by in conversation or re-
peatedly trying to stop automobiles and engage the occupants in
conversation.261 Though such conduct doesn't justify an arrest or con-
viction for loitering unless accompanied by the requisite intent, these
conduct lists do serve to harness police discretion and to give people
notice of what actions to avoid.
262
Of course, conduct lists are subject to the same overbreadth and
vagueness analyses as is the intent element. For example, a conduct
list drafted so broadly as to allow arrests and convictions based on
257. Thus, the intent element must be drafted so as to be an element separate from the other
elements of the offense. If proof of the intent element rests solely on engaging in conduct listed
in the conduct element, see infra part III.B.l.b, then the intent element is not sufficiently in-
dependent of the conduct element. True, engaging in the enumerated conduct may strongly
support the intent element in many situations. However, if the intent element is proven simply
by engaging in the enumerated conduct, then there are serious overbreadth problems because,
absent an illegal intent, much of the conduct in such lists is constitutionally protected. Further-
more, the more innocent the enumerated conduct is, the greater becomes the potential for police
overreaching, thus giving rise to vagueness problems.
258. See supra notes 59-62 and accompanying text.
259. See City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (Cleveland (Ohio) Mun. Ct.
1987); State v. Evans, 326 S.E.2d 303, 306 n.1 (N.C. Ct. App. 1985); City of Milwaukee v. Wilson,
291 N.W.2d 452, 457 (Wis. 1980); People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (N.Y. 1978).
260. See infra notes 299-304, 308-11 and accompanying text.
261. See Howard, 532 N.E.2d at 1326; Wilson, 291 N.W.2d at 455; Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1034.
262. See Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1035.
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conduct that is usually considered innocent-such as window shop-
ping or waiting for a bus-probably violates both the overbreadth and
the vagueness doctrines.263 The easiest means of avoiding such
problems is to require that the specified conduct be considered in light
of the surrounding circumstances. 264 In this way, people who are actu-
ally waiting for a bus will not automatically be eligible for arrest or
conviction. Rather, such persons would only be prone to arrest and
conviction if the police can articulate facts upon which to base a prob-
able cause belief that crime is afoot and that the specified intent ele-
ment has been fulfilled.
265
In this way, conduct lists cure at least two constitutional defects
common to loitering statutes. First, conduct lists help cure certain
vagueness defects by giving people notice of what types of activity
may subject them to arrest 266 and by limiting police discretion to en-
forcing the statute only when some overt act has been committed.
267
Second, the conduct lists provide an actus reus, guaranteeing that peo-
ple will only be punished for proscribed conduct as opposed to pro-
scribed status.268 This helps the loitering statute overcome status
doctrine challenges.
c. The Probable Cause Requirement
The Fourth Amendment's probable cause requirement is not lim-
ited to loitering laws. Rather, no criminal law may predicate either
arrest or conviction upon anything less than probable cause.269 How-
ever, loitering laws have long blurred the distinction between prob-
able cause and mere suspicion.270 Because they are aimed at
263. See Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239, 243 (Va. Ct. App. 1988).
264. See infra notes 305, 312 and accompanying text.
265. See Timmons v. City of Montgomery, 658 F. Supp. 1086 (M.D. Ala. 1987) (striking down
a loitering ordinance under the Fourth Amendment because arrests could be predicated on
something less than a probable cause belief that the suspect has either committed or is commit-
ting a crime); Porta v. Mayor, Omaha, 593 F. Supp. 863 (D. Neb. 1984) (requiring police to
enforce a loitering ordinance in compliance with Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and, when
applicable, probable cause).
266. See supra part II.A.2. Simply stated, conduct lists inform people what types of conduct
to avoid engaging in before they engage in that conduct and subject themselves to arrest for
violating a loitering statute.
267. See supra part II.A.3; see also People v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1035 (N.Y. 1978). This
means that the police may not enforce a loitering statute when they observe any actions that
happen to strike their fancy as being suspicious or improper.
268. See supra part II.D. This is why the intent element alone is not enough to support a
constitutionally valid loitering statute. The conduct list guarantees that the person arrested will
be arrested for actual improper conduct (in addition to violating the other elements of the of-
fense) rather than for merely being a "known" criminal appearing in public.
269. See supra part II.C.1.
270. See supra part II.C.2.
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preventing crime at an early stage, loitering laws by their very nature
often predicate arrest on something less than probable cause. 271 After
all, if the police have probable cause to believe that a suspect is actu-
ally committing a crime, that suspect could be properly arrested and
charged with one of the more serious inchoate offenses.
272
Unfortunately, the courts have largely ignored the probable cause
requirement when passing on the constitutionality of loitering laws.
273
As a result, there is no truly coherent principle to apply when testing
loitering laws against the probable cause requirement. However,
there are several judicial opinions which can be used as a springboard
in developing minimal probable cause requirements.
As usual, the first case to look at in developing these require-
ments is Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville. In Papachristou, the
Court discussed the Jacksonville ordinance's Fourth Amendment im-
plications by noting that allowing arrests on less than probable cause
violated the vagueness doctrine because of the failure to harness po-
lice discretion.274 The Court noted that police can only make arrests
based on probable cause: "Arresting a person on suspicion.., is for-
eign to our system" of government.275 Thus, at the very least loitering
laws can only be enforced pursuant to a probable cause belief that
some law is being broken.
Were this all that the courts have said on this issue, the analysis
could end here because all loitering laws would be unconstitutional.
As has been noted, loitering laws are preventive statutes;276 they try to
prevent crime before crime has actually occurred. Moreover, simple
loitering itself isn't illegal, nor may it constitutionally be made ille-
gal. 277 Thus, at first glance it appears that loitering laws allow arrests
based solely on a relatively unsubstantiated hunch that someone may
be ready to engage in criminal activity. Regardless of how this is
worded, the conclusion remains the same: loitering laws allow arrests
on mere suspicion of future criminality.
However, loitering statutes may meet Fourth Amendment re-
quirements if they sufficiently delineate activities upon which the po-
271. See id
272. See supra notes 50-51 and accompanying text.
273. But see United States ex reL Newsome v. Malcolm, 492 F.2d 1166 (2d Cir. 1974); Tim-
mons v. City of Montgomery, 658 F. Supp. 1086 (M.D. Ala. 1987); Porta v. Mayor, Omaha, 593
F. Supp. 863 (D. Neb. 1984); Farber v. Rochford, 407 F. Supp. 529 (N.D. I11. 1975).
274. Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 168-70 (1972).
275. Id. at 169.
276. See supra notes 48-52 and accompanying text.
277. Papachristou, 405 U.S. at 164; Trosch, supra note 16, at 551; see also supra note 102.
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lice may base probable cause. In City of Tacoma v. Luvene,278 the
Washington Supreme Court upheld the Tacoma, Washington, antidrug
loitering ordinance in the face of an overbreadth challenge and a
vagueness challenge. The court's discussion of the vagueness doc-
trine's discretionary prong illustrates how conduct lists limit arrests to
circumstances where there is probable cause to believe that crime is
afoot.279 The court noted that coupling an overt act requirement with
an intent requirement allows the police to arrest people only where
there is "articulable, identifiable conduct that is consistent" with the
commission of whatever crime the loitering law is aimed at
preventing.280
Such a combination of an intent element and a conduct list seems
to satisfy the Fourth Amendment's totality-of-the-circumstances ap-
proach to probable cause. Granted, some of the overt actions deline-
ated in the conduct list may be wholly innocent when viewed alone. 281
However, those overt actions shouldn't be viewed in a vacuum. In-
stead, they should be viewed in light of the surrounding circum-
stances. 282 So long as a loitering law doesn't circumvent this
requirement, there is no reason to believe that the law will fail the
probable cause requirement.
2. Drafting a Constitutional Antigang Loitering Law
a. What Form Should Antigang Loitering Laws Take?
Before drafting an antigang loitering ordinance, the legislature
needs to decide what form such a law should take. At least two op-
tions are apparent. First, the loitering law can take an expansive ap-
proach, trying to prohibit each and every activity remotely associated
with criminal gang activity.283 This omnibus approach is typified by
the Chicago antigang loitering ordinance, which basically makes it ille-
gal for a suspected criminal gang member to simply be in public and
for non-gang members to publicly associate for no apparent reason
with suspected gang members.284
278. 827 P.2d 1374 (Wash. 1992).
279. Id. at 1385.
280. Id.
281. See infra text accompanying notes 304, 309-10.
282. See supra notes 264-65 and accompanying text.
283. See, e.g., Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 (1972) (quoting the
Jacksonville, Florida, loitering ordinance which was directed at such acts as begging, gambling,
juggling, playing unlawful games, drinking excessively, stealing, acting lewdly and lasciviously,
brawling, loafing, and walking at night, to name but a few).
284. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015.
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Of course, the expansive approach doesn't have to follow the
Chicago ordinance, particularly since doing so would probably render
it unconstitutional.285 Instead, the expansive approach could be bro-
ken into sections, with each section criminalizing a specific type of
loitering. For example, the first section could embody an antidrug loi-
tering provision; the second section could embody an anti-intimida-
tion loitering provision; the third section could embody an
antiprostitution loitering provision; and so on.
Yet this piece-by-piece approach isn't without its problems, both
practically and constitutionally. Because criminal gangs are involved
in so many types of criminal activity,286 such an approach may prove
impractical by its length alone since each section would require its
own intent element and its own conduct list. Yet another practical
concern is that many of the criminal activities these gangs engage in
are simply not conducive to standardized conduct lists. Many gang
crimes such as murder, armed robbery, and aggravated battery are
simply not typified by visible, predictable preparatory behavior at a
level lower than that meeting the elements of the inchoate offenses.
28 7
Soliciting prostitution, on the other hand, typically occurs in full view
of the public and is usually accompanied by consistent overt acts such
as repeatedly flagging down automobiles and pedestrians. This sug-
gests the constitutional concern that such a long loitering statute with
such extensive and questionable conduct lists may violate both the
overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines. The vagueness doctrine is
implicated because the longer the conduct list becomes, the greater
becomes the likelihood that a suspect's actions will fit at least one
overt action contained in the statute.288 Because almost any otherwise
innocent action can be covered by exhaustive conduct lists, such a
statute fails to sufficiently harness police discretion and to provide
people with notice of what is forbidden.28 9 The overbreadth doctrine
is implicated because the longer the conduct list becomes, the greater
285. See supra part III.A.
286. See CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(3).
287. Granted, some of these things could be prefaced by publicly visible, preparatory behav-
ior, such as casing a bank prior to robbing it. However, these crimes are usually prepared in
private or done on the spur of the moment. Any publicly visible preparatory activities leading to
such serious crimes is probably punishable under one of the inchoate offenses and would thus
not properly be prevented by loitering laws.
288. See Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 156 n.1 (1972) (quoting the Jack-
sonville, Florida, loitering ordinance which, although it doesn't contain a conduct list, prohibits
so many types of conduct as to render the ordinance void for vagueness).
289. See supra part II.A.
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the likelihood becomes that constitutionally protected activities will
be punished by the statute.
29°
Fortunately, there is a narrower second approach to drafting an
antigang loitering statute. The narrow approach consists of enacting
only a few loitering laws aimed at preventing the most visible and seri-
ous criminal gang activities. Thus, the legislature could, at the least,
enact an antidrug loitering statute and an antiprostitution loitering
statute.
Several features recommend the narrow approach. First, this ap-
proach doesn't require extensive conduct lists.291 Second, the crimes
prevented by such an approach often occur in plain view of the public.
And third, the crimes prevented are typified by certain overt actions
or circumstances. 292 As a result of these features, the narrow ap-
proach avoids many of the overbreadth and vagueness problems suf-
fered by the expansive approach. However, there is a cost to avoiding
constitutional problems: the narrow approach cannot prevent all
criminal gang activities. 293
Nevertheless, at least one of the most serious activities associated
with criminal gangs-narcotics trafficking-can be attacked by the
narrow approach to loitering laws. Of course, prostitution can also be
curbed by loitering laws. Unlike the Chicago ordinance, the enforce-
ment of loitering laws under this approach isn't limited to criminal
gang members. Rather, all drug dealers, drug users, and prostitutes
are properly within the purview of this approach.
b. Constitutional Loitering Statutes
Antidrug loitering statutes are a relatively recent legislative inno-
vation.294 At least one author has attacked the constitutionality of
these laws on vagueness, overbreadth, and Fourth Amendment
grounds.295 However, at least one state supreme court has upheld the
constitutionality of an antidrug loitering ordinance in the face of
vagueness and overbreadth challenges. In City of Tacoma v. Luvene,
290. See supra part II.B.
291. See infra text accompanying notes 299-304, 308-11.
292. See City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1379 n.2 (Wash. 1992); People v. Smith,
378 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (N.Y. 1978).
293. On the other hand, drafting a loitering ordinance for each crime committed by criminal
gang members, see CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(3), is not only impractical, but it is
also probably impossible. Many of the crimes that criminal gang members commit are simply
not the proper subject for loitering laws.
294. See Trosch, supra note 16, at 513.
295. See id. at 533-64.
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the Washington Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of the
city's antidrug loitering ordinance after interpreting and limiting that
ordinance to require both specific intent and "identifiable, articulable
conduct in addition to mere loitering that is consistent with the intent
to engage in unlawful drug activity .... ",296
Having survived constitutional scrutiny, the Tacoma antidrug loi-
tering ordinance is a good place to start when drafting a model an-
tidrug loitering ordinance. As changed to meet both the Washington
Supreme Court's interpretation and the other considerations men-
tioned in this Note, a model antidrug loitering ordinance could read as
follows:
MODEL ANTIDRUG LOITERING ORDINANCE
(A) It is unlawful for any person to loiter in or near any thorough-
fare, place open to the public, or near any public or private place
297
296. City of Tacoma v. Luvene, 827 P.2d 1374, 1383 (Wash. 1992).
The Tacoma ordinance read as follows:
(A) It is unlawful for any person to loiter in or near any thoroughfare, place open to
the public, or near any public or private place in a manner and under circumstances
manifesting the purpose to engage in drug-related activity contrary to any of the provi-
sions of Chapters 69.41, 69.50, or 69.52 of the [Revised Code of Washington].
(B) Among the circumstances which may be considered in determining whether such
purpose is manifested are:
1. Such person is a known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller. For purposes
of this chapter, a "known unlawful drug user, possessor, or seller" is a person who
has, within the knowledge of the arresting officer, been convicted in any court
within this state of any violation involving the use, possession, or sale of any [con-
trolled substance] ... ; or a person who displays physical characteristics of drug
intoxication or usage, such as "needle tracks"; or a person who posses drug para-
phernalia as defined in Section 8.29 of the [Tacoma Municipal Code];
2. Such person is currently subject to an order prohibiting his/her presence in a
high drug activity geographic area;
3. Such person behaves in such a manner as to raise a reasonable suspicion that
he or she is about to engage in or is then engaged in an unlawful drug-related
activity, including by way of example only, such person acting as a "lookout";
4. Such person is physically identified by the officer as a member of a "gang," or
association which has as its purpose illegal drug activity;
5. Such person transfers small objects or packages for currency in a furtive
fashion;
6. Such person takes flight upon the appearance of a police officer;
7. Such person manifestly endeavors to conceal himself or herself or any object
which could reasonably be involved in an unlawful drug-related activity;
8. The area involved is by public repute known to be an area of unlawful drug use
and trafficking;
9. The premises involved are known to have been reported to law enforcement as
a place suspected of drug activity pursuant to [Revised Code of Washington Chap-
ter 69.53];
10. Any vehicle involved is registered to a known unlawful drug user, possessor,
or seller, or a person for whom there is an outstanding warrant for a crime involv-
ing drug-related activity.
Id. at 1379, 1379 n.2 (quoting TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 8.72.010 (1988)).
297. Id. at 1379. There are many direct quotes from various statutes contained in both this
statute and in the antiprostitution loitering ordinance below. Rather than muck up the ordi-
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with the intent to engage in any statutorily prohibited drug-related
activity.
298
(B) Circumstances manifesting such purpose on the part of a per-
son are:
299
(1) The person transfers small objects or packages for currency in
an elusive manner,3°° or the person repeatedly passes to or receives
money or objects from passers-by;
30 1
(2) The person takes flight upon the appearance of a police
officer;
3 ° 2
(3) The person visibly attempts to conceal himself or herself or any
object which could reasonably be involved in an unlawful drug-re-
lated activity;303 or
(4) The person repeatedly beckons to, stops, or attempts to stop
passers-by, or repeatedly attempts to engage passers-by in
conversation.
3o4
nances with an endless series of quotation marks, I have merely noted after each quoted section
the source of the phrase or sentence.
298. This language unambiguously sets forth the intent requirement. See supra notes 249-58
and accompanying text. Legislatures could tailor this section somewhat by substituting specific
antidrug statute citations in place of "drug-related activity."
299. See Northern Virginia Chapter, ACLU v. City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. 324, 325
(E.D. Va. 1990). Some of the manifestations contained in the Tacoma ordinance are deleted
from the text model ordinance because of potential constitutional problems. See Luvene, 827
P.2d at 1379 n.2 (quoting, in part, TACOMA, WASH., MUN. CODE ch. 8.72.010(B)(1), (3)-(4), (8)-
(10)). The first and tenth manifestations raise serious status implications because they render
drug addicts subject to arrest simply for being drug addicts and not for committing any overt act.
See supra part II.D. The third manifestation raises vagueness problems because it leaves to the
police officer's discretion exactly what types of behavior are sufficient to raise a reasonable sus-
picion. See supra part II.A. Additionally, merely using the term "reasonable suspicion" raises
Fourth Amendment implications that are better off avoided. See supra part II.C. The fourth
manifestation also raises serious status problems because it may lead to arrests based solely on a
person's suspected associations. See supra parts II.D, III.A.4. The eighth and ninth manifesta-
tions have potential vagueness implications because they may make mere presence in a high-
crime area sufficient basis for an arrest. See supra part II.A.
300. See City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. at 325; Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1379 n.2.
301. See Trosch, supra note 16, at 523, 524-25 nn.72-73 (quoting, respectively, CHARLO'rTE,
N.C., CODE § 15-31(b)(5) (1990); HIGH Ponrr, N.C., CODE, § 12-1-9(b)(5) (1989); FAYETrE-
VILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(6) (1989)).
302. Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1379 n.2; Trosch, supra note 16, at 523, 524-25 nn.72-73 (quoting,
respectively, CHAm. morE, N.C., CODE § 15-31(b)(5) (1990); HIGH POINT, N.C., CODE, § 12-1-
9(b)(5) (1989); FAYErrEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(6) (1989)). This is a long recognized man-
ifestation of at least some sort of illegal conduct. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 (1961).
It should be noted that MODEL PENAL CODE § 250.6 isn't the best statute to turn to when
drafting a loitering ordinance. At least one court has found a loitering law based on § 250.6
unconstitutionally vague. See City of Bellevue v. Miller, 536 P.2d 603 (Wash. 1975).
303. See Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1379 n.2; City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. at 325.
304. This is the most popular conduct clause, and it is contained in nearly every loitering
statute. See, e.g., Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1379 n.2; Coleman v. City of Richmond, 364 S.E.2d 239,
242 (Va. Ct. App. 1988); City of Cleveland v. Howard, 532 N.E.2d 1325, 1326 (Cleveland (Ohio)
Mun. Ct. 1985); Trosch, supra note 16, at 523, 524-25 nn.72-73 (quoting, respectively, CHAR-
LOT E, N.C., CODE § 15-31(b)(5) (1990); HIGH Poir, N.C., CODE, § 12-1-9(b)(5) (1989); FAY-
E-rEVILLE, N.C., CODE § 21-55(c)(6) (1989)). Of course, this type of clause, standing alone,
would be insufferably vague. However, when applied in conjunction with the totality-of-the-
circumstances clause, see infra text accompanying note 305, such a vague clause is constitutional
because it limits police officers to arresting people only when the conduct is engaged in under
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(C) No person shall be arrested for a violation of this ordinance
unless, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, the
conduct engaged in supports a probable cause belief that the person
is loitering with the intent to engage in any statutorily prohibited
drug-related activity.
305
Drafting an antiprostitution loitering statute is a relatively simple
task because so many such statutes have already been subjected to
and passed constitutional scrutiny. However, this Note will still pro-
pose a model antiprostitution loitering ordinance that combines the
common attributes of those other loitering laws. A model antiprosti-
tution loitering ordinance could read as follows:
MODEL ANTIPROSTITUTION LOITERING ORDINANCE
(A) It is unlawful for any person to loiter in or near any thorough-
fare, place open to the public, or near any public or private place3
° 6
with the intent to solicit or procure sexual activity for hire. 307
(B) Circumstances manifesting such purpose on the part of a per-
son are:30
8
(1) The person repeatedly beckons to, stops, or attempts to stop
passers-by, or repeatedly engages passers-by in conversation;30 9
(2) The person repeatedly stops or attempts to stop motor vehi-
cles;3 10 or
circumstances supporting a probable cause belief that the repeated beckonings are attempts to
traffic narcotics.
305. There is more to this section than merely codifying the Supreme Court's decision in
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983). The main purpose of this section is to make clear that
merely engaging in the enunciated conduct isn't enough for either an arrest or a conviction
under this ordinance. Conversely, this section also makes clear that innocent conduct may some-
times justify an arrest if the surrounding circumstances justify a probable cause belief that the
conduct in question is not so innocent in a given circumstance. In conjunction with the intent
requirement, this helps to cure Fourth Amendment and vagueness problems because it prevents
the police from arresting every single person who engages in the enunciated conduct without
regard to the possibly exculpatory circumstances accompanying that conduct.
The police may consider many things under the totality-of-the-circumstances approach.
Those factors include whether the suspect is a known drug dealer or drug user; whether the
loitering occurs in an area of widespread drug use or drug trafficking; and whether there is any
other legitimate reason to be loitering, such as waiting for a bus or the like. No status problems
arise from this because these factors are viewed only in concert with the overt act requirement.
Thus, mere status isn't punished; rather, the overt conduct coupled with the unlawful intent are
punished. Nor is there a vagueness problem since the police can only arrest people when there
has been specific overt action. The totality of the circumstances cannot lead to an arrest under
this ordinance if the suspect engages in none of the delineated conduct.
306. Luvene, 827 P.2d at 1379.
307. Howard, 532 N.E.2d at 1326. Because in this case the city's ordinance wasn't statute-
specific, its language is broad enough for other jurisdictions to use. Other jurisdictions are still
free to insert the citations of their antiprostitution legislation in place of this language. The
result is the same for purposes of constitutional analysis.
308. See Northern Virginia Chapter, ACLU v. City of Alexandria, 747 F. Supp. 324, 325
(E.D. Va. 1990).
309. Howard, 532 N.E.2d at 1326. Nearly all antiprostitution loitering ordinances have this
conduct requirement. See City of Milwaukee v. Wilson, 291 N.W.2d 452, 455 (Wis. 1980); People
v. Smith, 378 N.E.2d 1032, 1034 (N.Y. 1978).
310. Howard, 532 N.E.2d at 1326; Wilson, 291 N.W.2d at 455; Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1034.
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(3) The person repeatedly engages passers-by in conversation.311
(C) No person shall be arrested for a violation of this ordinance
unless, when viewed under the totality of the circumstances, the
conduct engaged in supports a probable cause belief that the person
is loitering with the intent to solicit or procure sexual activity for
hire.
312
There may be other criminal gang activities that legislatures may
wish to attack through loitering laws. 313 The introductory comments
to the Chicago ordinance recommend many other ills connected to
criminal gangs that deserve attention.314 However, for myriad reasons
some of those problems cannot be properly dealt with through loiter-
ing laws. Yet, there are surely other criminal activities for which loi-
tering laws are a viable preventive option. As those new situations
arise, legislatures should be capable of crafting specialized loitering
laws to meet society's needs. There is no reason to believe that such
laws will be unconstitutional so long as they follow the basic guide-
lines laid out in this Note and in the ever-evolving case law.
CONCLUSION
Loitering laws can serve an instrumental function in helping law
enforcement authorities prevent not just criminal gang activities, but
all manner of criminal shenanigans. However, such laws must be care-
fully drafted to meet certain constitutional infirmities common to loi-
tering laws. Loitering laws that fail to meet these constitutional
guidelines present the danger of seriously trampling upon liberties we
Americans typically hold dear. Loitering laws that meet constitu-
tional mandate as well as serve their preventive function provide us all
with the best of both worlds-streets free of violence and speech and
expression rights free of censorship.
311. Howard, 532 N.E.2d at 1326; Wilson, 291 N.W.2d at 455; Smith, 378 N.E.2d at 1034.
312. This section is identical to the model antigang loitering ordinance's paragraph (C). See
supra text accompanying note 305. In this ordinance, the presence of this section is particularly
important to cure potential overbreadth problems. For example, under the clear wording of this
ordinance's paragraph (B)(3), advocating political beliefs to every passer-by would fulfill the
conduct element. Granted, the intent element wouldn't be fulfilled, but this section is an addi-
tional safeguard which puts everyone on notice that the circumstances surrounding the enunci-
ated conduct will determine whether the ordinance has been violated. See supra note 305.
313. See, e.g., CHICAGO, ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-4-015(c)(3).
314. See Floor Debates, supra note 189, at 18,293-94.
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